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Intrahousehold finances offer a window into the crossroads between the market 
domain’s emphasis on self-reliance and the family domain’s emphasis on 
interdependence. Modern couples confront tensions between ideals of mutual family 
interests and values of individualism, a departure from fitting themselves into culturally 
expected family arrangements of the past. How these social changes impact progress 
towards gender equality is not well understood. The dissertation aims are to: (1) identify 
mechanisms associated with different types of money arrangements in families, and (2) 
examine the association between financial arrangements and gender inequality in 
families. To meet these aims, I used data from two sources. First, I used multinomial 
modeling of 2012 International Social Survey Programme data to show cohabiting 
couples in countries with greater gender equality partially integrated their money instead 
of keeping it separate. Married couples pooled money regardless of country-level gender 
equality. Findings suggest that different cultural logics operate in married and cohabiting 
partnerships across gendered contexts, rather than cohabitation functioning as a weaker 
 
 
form of marriage. Second, I devised a novel survey experiment to collect the first 
nationally representative sample of U.S. adults’ attitudes about income sharing in 
families. Results challenge the notion that marriage distinctively encourages support for 
financial integration in families. Findings also revealed that respondents believed higher-
earning partners ought to hold back a greater absolute value of their earnings for personal 
use, allowing inequality in labor market rewards to perpetuate unequal conditions within 
families. I also used this data to disentangle the mechanisms associated with perceptions 
of decision-making authority. Findings indicated higher relative-earners within families 
were not regarded as entitled to the final word in decisions. Whether respondents 
considered earnings individually or community owned did not explain the lack of 
association between relative earnings and decision-making clout. Instead, findings 
showed a significant association between the fictional decider’s gender and respondents’ 
perceptions of fairness. Specifically, when women were presented as the decider over 
monetary family choices, unilateral decision making about monetary items was viewed 
more favorably. Collectively, these findings suggest gender socialization theories are 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Changing gender roles and increasing diversity of families influence the symbolic 
meaning of money entering the household (Nyman 2003; Zelizer 1989). Through the 
mid-19th century, cultural and structural features predestined wives’ earnings as 
belonging to their husbands. Thereafter, couples gradually began to replace male-
controlled allocation methods with joint accounts and a steady stream of court decisions 
and state laws progressively began granting women more economic rights (Zelizer 1989). 
Further social demographic changes – such as increasing participation of married women 
in the labor force, rising divorce rates, an expansion of cohabitation, and delayed 
marriages (Bumpass and Lu 2000; Spain and Bianchi 1996) – resulted in relationship 
expectations becoming de-standardized and financial arrangements becoming 
individually negotiated (Burgoyne 2008; Kenney 2006). A departure from fitting 
themselves into culturally expected family arrangements of the past, tensions have 
emerged as couples try to balance investments in their family unit with values of 
independence (Burgoyne 2008). 
How these social changes impact progress towards gender equality is not well 
understood. For instance, increases in women’s waged work were expected to increase 
women’s bargaining power within the family, as women contribute more financial 
resources to the common pot (Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994). Yet, inequality between 
partners persists (England 2010, 2011). Explanations for persistent gender inequality, 
despite women’s gain in the marketplace, may be lacking in part because much of the 
family inequality literature rests on two assumptions: 1) couples pool financial resources, 
and 2) earnings translate into power. 
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Intrahousehold finances offer a window into the crossroads between the market 
domain’s emphasis on self-reliance and the family domain’s emphasis on 
interdependence (Bellah et al. 2008). A preponderance of research on intrahousehold 
finances relies on Pahl's (1989) typologies of money management, developed from 
qualitative interviews of married British couples. Pahl’s (1989, 1995) typologies include 
the following categories: (a) whole wage system where one person manages all of the 
household finances; (b) allowance system in which the main breadwinner provides a 
fixed sum for household expenses and keeps the rest for personal spending; (c) pooling 
system wherein couples pool all, or nearly all, of their money and treat it as a collective 
resource; and (d) independent management system where couples maintain individual 
control of their earnings and keep their money separate. Researchers later specified 
another category, called partial-pooling. Partial-pooling couples keep most of their 
money separate, maintaining individual control over areas defined as personal, but pool 
enough money to cover expenses defined as shared (Ashby and Burgoyne 2008). 
The ways couples allocate money within the household may compound or reverse 
women’s already disadvantaged position resulting from gender inequality in the 
marketplace (Kenney 2004, 2006). Conflicting arguments are found in the literature on 
whether pooling financial resources or holding some money back from the common pot 
best ensures equitable access and control over financial resources. One argument is that 
pooled money theoretically redistributes unequal market earnings. In actuality, pooled 
organizational systems often fail to live up to the ideal of being equally shared (Addo and 
Sassler 2010; Bisdee, Daly, and Price 2013; Burgoyne 1990; Burgoyne and Lewis 1994; 
Burgoyne and Morison 1997; Kenney 2006). An alternative argument is that couples are 
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more likely to keep their money separate when women are in the paid labor force (Treas 
and Widmer 2000). Lesbian and gay couples who emphasize equality are most likely to 
partially pool or independently manage their income (Burns, Burgoyne, and Clarke 
2008). Interestingly, women not currently employed report they expect to keep future 
earnings separate once they reenter the labor market (Burgoyne 1990). Yet, separate 
management systems frequently exacerbate preexisting gendered pay inequalities because 
the lower-earning partner, usually the woman in heterosexual partnerships, has less 
access to and control over the household’s total income (Knudsen and Wærness 2009; 
Roman and Vogler 1999; Vogler 2005; Vogler, Lyonette, and Wiggins 2008; Vogler, 
Lyonette, et al. 2008). Understanding the sources of these arrangements may be 
important to resolving these inconsistencies and ultimately for understanding persistent 
gender inequality within families. 
Another shortcoming of the current research stream is that it contains shifting and 
sometimes contradictory interpretations about the meaning of financial organizational 
strategies. Couples increasingly keep some or all money separately than they did in the 
past (Ashby and Burgoyne 2009; Burgoyne et al. 2006, 2007; Knudsen and Wærness 
2009; Pahl 2005; Vogler, Brockmann, and Wiggins 2006). This trend has generated 
claims that the rise in withholding money from a shared pot symbolizes one of a myriad 
of differing social phenomena: the increasing instability of families (Burgoyne et al. 
2010); a shift towards individualized marriages (Lauer and Yodanis 2011); or evidence of 
movement towards an ethic of gender equality (Elizabeth 2001; Vogler, Brockmann, and 
Wiggins 2008). Due to the heterogeneity of families, couples who maintain some form of 
independent money management system may do so for a variety of reasons, including 
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non-commitment to the union, a desire to create equal partnerships, or for logistical 
reasons such as maintaining a personal checking account established prior to the 
relationship (Ashby and Burgoyne 2008, 2009; Bennett 2013; Elizabeth 2001). 
Further complicating analyses, couples’ approaches to money are not static, 
changing as their relationships develop (Addo and Sassler 2010; Burgoyne et al. 2006), 
as norms of partnering shift (Ashby and Burgoyne 2008; Vogler et al. 2006), and as they 
adapt to an evolving “electronic economy” (e.g., credit and debit cards, internet shopping, 
retailer cards) (Pahl 1999). Analyses of categorical variables are limited in their ability to 
capture interacting components of intrahousehold finances, such as negotiations and the 
outcomes of these practices. Snapshots of couples’ money arrangements do not reveal 
how these arrangements came to be or how their intentions change over time. For 
instance, aging itself does not seem to be associated with changes in how couples allocate 
their income, but the development of health problems seems to bring about new methods 
for handling finances (Bisdee et al. 2013). Partial-pooling couples, in particular, may be 
more likely to talk about their money arrangements as fluid, rather than fixed (Burns et 
al. 2008). To resolve these potentially conflicting interpretations, this dissertation 
investigates the cultural norms associated with the treatment of money in families. 
Theoretical and Substantive Contributions 
Research on the household economy is predominantly shaped by economic 
theory, viewing power as determined through an exchange of resources (Zelizer 1989). 
Rational choice economic theories argue that heads of households are altruistic, 
contributing a larger proportion of money into the family pot and allocating resources 
equitably among family members to provide for their collective welfare (Becker 1981). 
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Thus, treating families as the appropriate unit of analysis becomes theoretically justified 
(Becker 1974), and consequently, national surveys of financial well-being regularly treat 
households as “economic black boxes” (Ferree 1990). 
However, economic dependence arguments have largely been unable to explain 
persistently unequal household labor division between men and women (Gupta 2007). 
Resource theories fail to take into account what happens to individual income once it 
enters households, overlooking the influence ideological factors have on intrahousehold 
finances (Kenney 2006; Roman and Vogler 1999). Additionally, earning money does not 
necessarily lead to control or power (England 2011; Pahl 1980). For example, when 
income is truly considered “family money,” personal earnings are less likely to be seen as 
a source of power, having little influence on inequality measures such as time spent on 
housework (Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al. 2011). 
Sociologists have noted economic suppositions are frequently unrealistic: 
ignoring women’s unpaid labor as self-sacrificing; falsely assuming family members’ 
choices are never detrimental; and disregarding the lack of portability of household labor 
as currency, that is, time investments in the family cannot be exchanged for money 
outside of the specific relationship (Bergmann 1996; England 1989; Roman and Vogler 
1999). In addition, beliefs about entitlement to control over earned money could result in 
individuals within households experiencing disparate economic realities, making 
individuals the more informative unit of analysis (Hartmann 1981; Vogler and Pahl 1994; 
Zelizer 1989).  
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Three Ideologies: Family Unity, Autonomy, Gender 
This project contributes to sociological theories of gender inequality by 
illuminating how conceptions of family unity, autonomy, and gender influence the 
distribution of resources within families. Investigating intrahousehold finances to 
determine the mechanisms associated with couples’ organization of money will help 
resolve the theoretical puzzle of why women’s increased financial resources fail to reduce 
gender inequality in the home and lead to improved operationalization of couples’ power 
dynamics.  
Family Unity. From an exchange theory perspective, the integration of financial 
resources is most likely to occur in long-term, stable relationships because it minimizes 
transaction costs (Treas 1993). Marriage is by definition the legal integration of 
resources, and research consistently shows married partners are more likely than 
cohabiting couples to pool their financial resources (Hamplová and Le Bourdais 2009; 
Hamplová, Le Bourdais, and Lapierre-Adamcyk 2014; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; 
Kenney 2004, 2006; Lyngstad, Noack, and Tufte 2011; Vogler et al. 2006). Parental 
status also seems to matter for the likelihood of combining financial resources, with 
parents behaving more alike than non-parents, no matter their marital status (Barlow 
2008; Kenney 2004). Couples’ integration of resources is also thought to be influenced 
by their expectations of the continuity of the relationship, an explanation for the higher 
integration levels of married couples compared to cohabitors (Burgoyne et al. 2010; 
Desai 1992; Treas 1993). Consequently, some scholars interpret the increase in 




Autonomy. Alternatively, increases in keeping money for individual use may be 
symbolic of the cultural transition to “individualized marriages” rather than indicative of 
family instability (Cherlin 2004). Couples may withhold money as a specific tactic to 
ensure each person has access to and control over a specific proportion of money 
(Elizabeth 2001). Although the marriage contract requires financial support of spouses 
and the treatment of the family as one cohesive economic unit (Barlow 2008), people 
earn money in the labor market as individuals (Burgoyne 1990; Burgoyne and Lewis 
1994; Nyman and Reinikainen 2007). Even when income is perceived as a collective 
resource, and understood as legally shared in the case of marriage, partners remain 
cognizant of how money is earned, and engage in mental accounting – earmarking and 
distinguishing between different kinds of money (Burgoyne 1990; Burgoyne et al. 2006; 
Burgoyne and Lewis 1994). For instance, many men view bonuses as personal money not 
necessarily deposited into a shared family pot (Zelizer 1989). 
Gender. Notions of autonomy take place within a context of continuing gender 
inequality (Bennett 2013). Women have gained influence in family decision making 
(Belch and Willis 2002) and have increased their control over family money as the 
difference in their relative income has diminished (Kenney 2006). Yet, women’s earnings 
may be viewed differently than men’s earnings, often earmarked for childcare and 
housekeeping expenses (Burgoyne 1990; Zelizer 1997). Women’s discretionary spending 
is often contingent on the family’s budgetary needs overall, whereas men tend to pay 
themselves first (Tichenor 1999). An early study found that higher-earning wives did not 
translate their higher-earning status into power in the same ways as men (Stamp 1985). 
Women may be more likely than men to refrain from viewing their earnings as entitling 
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them to power (Burgoyne 2004; Burgoyne et al. 2006). Thus, women’s increased 
earnings may be insufficient to increase their ability to negotiate equitable arrangements 
in their families, as evidenced by entitlement to greater personal spending money or equal 
divisions of time spent on household labor. 
Broader Impacts 
Academics and policymakers alike have an interest in focusing on intrahousehold 
finances. Systematically analyzing income organizational strategies has important 
implications for understanding marital stability and economic insecurity and inequality. 
First, policymakers would benefit from knowing what financial management systems 
mitigate relationship strain or contribute to family distress, as satisfaction with finances is 
predictive of family stability (Addo and Sassler 2010; Dew 2008; Smock, Manning, and 
Porter 2005). Families are no longer stable economic units (Cherlin 2009) and the way 
resources are allocated within families impacts the distribution of resources when couples 
break up, an important topic of investigation given the disproportionate economic impact 
for women when relationships end (Burgoyne 1990; Hobson 1990). Secondly, unpacking 
the economic black box of intrahousehold finances is necessary to develop needed 
alternative measurements of poverty (Brady 2003), as the assumption that income is 
shared equally within families is faulty. For instance, victims of domestic violence often 
report their access to income increases after exiting an abusive relationship, when their 
objective “family income” plunges them into the official poverty category (Pahl 1985), 
because they gain a level of control over their own finances that was previously lacking.  
It is in the public interest to understand intrahousehold finances because public 
policies – such as marital and divorce laws, welfare legislation, and federal tax policy – 
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are built on conflicting conceptions about income organization within families (Ashby 
and Burgoyne 2008; Barlow 2008; Bisdee et al. 2013; Kenney 2004). Tax policy and 
poverty indicators assume resource pooling for married but not cohabiting partners, while 
welfare policy operates from an assumption that marital status is irrelevant when 
considering parents’ obligations to children (Kenney 2004). Divorce laws intervene to 
protect the weaker economic spouse in the event of relationship dissolution, whereas 
marital laws respect the autonomy of spouses so long as the couple is married (Barlow 
2008). 
Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation examined how conceptions of family unity, economic autonomy, 
and gender influence couples’ organization of money and how these financial 
arrangements contribute to inequality. Two aims guided this research: (1) identify 
mechanisms associated with different types of money arrangements in families and (2) 
examine the association between financial arrangements and gender inequality in 
families. To meet these aims, I used data from the 2012 International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP) and an original experimental vignette study. 
Chapter 2 used data from ISSP in order to understand how macro and micro 
mechanisms influence couples’ allocation of financial resources (aim 1). Cross-national 
studies suggest that the macro-level gender equality context shapes how couples organize 
their financial resources, though the conclusions have been contradictory. Some research 
suggests couples are more likely to keep their money separate in contexts that approve of 
women’s labor force participation (Treas and Widmer 2000). Countries with greater 
commitment to gender equality also seem to have high levels of cohabitation, and these 
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couples are the most likely to keep money separately. Alternatively, in contexts with 
greater commitment to gender equality, couples may be more likely to pool financial 
resources because pooled money theoretically redistributes unequal market earnings. A 
few studies indicate sharing money may be more egalitarian than keeping some money 
separate (Nyman 1999; Roman and Vogler 1999). To resolve these conflicting findings, I 
focused on the joint influences of gender inequality and family structure. Specifically, I 
investigated the association of couples’ relative income and marital status on their income 
organizational approaches in 20 countries with varying degrees of gender inequality. I 
made use of the Gender Inequality Index, a measurement of gender disparity developed 
by the United Nations Development Programme, to operationalize nation-level gender 
conditions. 
I attend also to aim 1 in Chapter 3, testing how beliefs about family and gender 
dynamics influence perceptions of couples’ organization of financial resources. The goal 
of this study was to better understand how modern families reconcile beliefs in collective 
family units and support for economic autonomy. It also investigated beliefs about gender 
dynamics in the home when inequalities prevalent in the labor market were made visible. 
To do so, I used original data from a nationally representative vignette-survey experiment 
(n = 3,986). Respondents selected an income allocation strategy for a fictional couple that 
varied in their marital and parental status, relative earnings, and relationship duration. 
This methodological approach is particularly useful for understanding the conditions 
under which someone might prioritize one cultural value over another (Cerulo 2014; 
DiMaggio 2014; Swidler 1986). 
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Chapter 4 addresses aim 2, assessing how relative earnings, financial 
arrangements, and gender ideology aggravate or mitigate gender inequality within 
families. The mechanisms associated with perceptions of decision-making authority in 
families, a common proxy for power in relationships are explored using relative resources 
and exchange theory, I made predictions about perceptions of fairness in decision-making 
and focused on two potential moderators: methods of allocating income within families 
and the gender system. Building from the vignette survey-experiment used in Chapter 3, 
respondents were subsequently asked to evaluate the fairness of a monetary and non-
monetary decision made by the fictional couples. To attend to the reasoning behind these 
mechanisms, I conclude with a critical discourse analysis of respondents’ short answer 




CHAPTER TWO: CROSS-NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MARRIED AND 
COHABITING COUPLES’ INCOME ORGANIZATION 
Abstract 
This comparative study investigated couples’ approaches to organization of income within 
their family units. Using data on 20 countries from the 2012 International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP) (n = 4,955), this study considered the influences of couples’ relative 
income and marital status on income organizational approaches in countries with varying 
degrees of gender inequality. Findings showed couples were more likely to report they 
jointly managed income in more gender equal countries compared with one money 
manager of pooled income than in countries with high gender inequality. This pattern was 
not moderated by the income homogamy of couples. In more gender equal contexts, 
married couples were more likely to report they pooled and jointly manage their money, 
compared with the large proportion of married couples who assigned one money manager 
in countries with high gender inequality. Comparatively, cohabiting couples were more 
likely to pool some money and keep some money separate in countries with greater gender 
equality. Findings suggest that different cultural logics operate in married and cohabiting 
partnerships across gendered contexts, rather than cohabitation functioning as a weaker 





Demographic changes such as the expansion of cohabitation, delayed marriages, 
increasing participation of married women in the labor force, and rising divorce rates 
resulted in expectations about income sharing within families becoming de-standardized 
and increasingly dependent on individual negotiations (Burgoyne 2008; Kenney 2006). 
Although researchers seem to agree that modern couples are more likely to practice 
individualized money arrangements than they were in the past, the extent of couples 
treating money as an individual rather than a collective resource varies considerably 
within and between countries (Knudsen and Wærness 2001; Treas and Widmer 2000). 
Despite national differences in the institutionalization of cohabitation, research has 
shown little or no cross-national difference in the gap between married and cohabiting 
couples’ level of integration of financial resources (Hamplová and Le Bourdais 2009; 
Hamplová et al. 2014; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003).  
In contrast, cross-national studies suggest that the gendered context seems to 
matter in how couples organize their financial resources, though the conclusions have 
been contradictory. On the one hand, couples may be more likely to keep their money 
separate in contexts that approve of women working (Treas and Widmer 2000). When 
women’s relative earning power increases, couples in the United States, France, and 
Spain tend to keep some of their money separate (Hamplová and Le Bourdais 2009). 
Alternatively, pooled money theoretically redistributes unequal market earnings. Thus, in 
contexts with greater commitment to gender equality, couples may be more likely to pool 
financial resources. Research on Swedish and British couples supports this hypothesis, 
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finding that jointly pooling resources was more egalitarian than keeping some or all 
income separate (Nyman 1999; Roman and Vogler 1999).  
One possibility for these conflicting conclusions is that prior research generally 
focuses on either the influence of gender inequality or the influence of family structure, 
but rarely both simultaneously. Given the interrelated nature of gender ideology and the 
propensity to marry, women’s status in society and family structure differences likely 
jointly influence the ways money is treated within families (Blakemore, Lawton, and 
Vartanian 2005; Treas and Widmer 2000). Yet, researchers primarily interested in 
relationship stability generally collapse income sharing arrangements into a dichotomous 
indicator of pooling or not pooling money. This approach emphasizes integration 
differences between cohabiting and married couples’ organization of income but 
disregards variation in control and access to money. In comparison, research focused on 
gender inequality attends to issues of money management (i.e., one money manager 
verses managing money together) but predominately excludes cohabitors from analyses, 
ignoring integration issues (Lauer and Yodanis 2011; Yodanis and Lauer 2007a, 2007b). 
The comparative studies that distinguish between cohabitating and married couples have 
considered relatively few countries: Sweden and the U.S. (Heimdal and Houseknecht 
2003); Denmark, France, Spain, and the U.S. (Hamplová and Le Bourdais 2009); and two 
Canadian regions (Hamplová et al. 2014).  
This chapter combines individual-level data with country-level data to try to 
resolve these conflicting findings. Specifically, I investigate the influences of couples’ 
relative income and marital status on income organizational approaches in countries with 
varying degrees of gender inequality, as measured by the Gender Inequality Index, a 
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measurement of gender disparity developed by the United Nations Development 
Programme. I combine gender equality and family structure considerations by evaluating 
four categories of income organization: one money manager, jointly managing pooled 
money, keeping all money separate, and integrating some but not all money. Not 
collapsing the variation in organization of money into a dichotomous measure (e.g., 
shared/separate; one manager/joint management) may reveal new insights into the ways 
couples reconcile contradictory values of the family domain’s emphasis on 
interdependence and the importance of self-reliance in the market domain (Bellah et al. 
2008; Yodanis and Lauer 2014). The extent to which relative resources is associated with 
unequal management of money in families may be dependent on the family structure. The 
advantage of this joint modeling of gender dynamics and family structure influences on 
income organizational approaches is that it may better reflect the ways cultural and 
structural forces influence family dynamics. 
Background 
The Influence of Women’s Earnings on Family Money 
Though power dynamics among couples are often explained as an outcome of 
couples’ characteristics, how money is organized in families is also shaped by 
institutional and cultural structures (Roman and Vogler 1999; Yodanis and Lauer 2007a, 
2007b). For instance, a study of Sweden and Britain demonstrated that relative income 
and breadwinning ideology both structured how couples allocated their money, albeit in 
different ways in each country (Roman and Vogler 1999). The way money is distributed 
in families is highly influenced by women’s participation in the labor market, which 
varies widely between countries (Hobson 1990). This variation in women’s labor force 
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participation is at least partly attributed to nation level policies. Women in Nordic 
countries, such as Sweden for example, enjoy a range of policy supports that bolster their 
workforce participation (Hobson 1990). Additionally, joint taxation as opposed to 
individual taxation tends to decrease work incentives for lower earning partners, typically 
women (Figari et al. 2011).  
Rather than evaluating the effect of specific policies on the treatment of money in 
families, this study used the Gender Inequality Index (GII), which provides a 
comprehensive measurement of the cultural context that may moderate family-level 
associations1. The GII was introduced in a 2010 Human Development Report to measure 
three aspects of gender inequality: 1) reproductive health, measured by the maternal 
mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; 2) empowerment, measured as the proportion of 
women who occupy parliamentary seats and the proportion of women to men aged 25 
years and older with some secondary education; and 3) economic status, measured as the 
female labor force participation rate (ages 15 years and older) (Gaye et al. 2010). Thus, 
the GII measures a set of nation-level factors related to the gendered context of a country 
that are expected to influence micro-level behavior. Because the goal of this study is not 
to identify an exact country level mechanism, but how the gendered cultural context 
might moderate individual level forces related to money organization in families, the 
assumption of joint significance of multiple dimensions of inequality is an advantageous 
feature of the GII. Establishing generalizable links between macro-level influences and 
individual level outcomes is challenging due to the difficulties operationalizing country-
                                                 
1 Appendix A, Table A.3 and Table A.4 show other country level factors for OECD nations. None of these 




level variables (Lewis and Den Dulk 2008; Ollier-Malaterre et al. 2013; Yu 2015). 
Studies of specific policy effects always carry the risk that other macro-level forces 
explain the identified nation level effects (Yu 2015). The GII is beneficial to addressing 
these concerns because the constellation of factors captured allows for exploration of the 
influence of the broader social context. 
 A substantial body of literature has also established the importance of 
relative resources, the gap between men’s share and women’s share of the family’s 
earned income, on couples’ power dynamics (Brines 1994; Evertsson and Nermo 2004; 
Sørensen and McLanahan 1987; Tichenor 1999). Greater economic opportunities for 
women are assumed to be associated with more favorable outcomes for women in the 
home, as their bargaining power increases (Baxter and Kane 1995; Cha and Thébaud 
2009). Indeed, women have gained influence in family decision making (Belch and 
Willis 2002) and increasingly have control of family money as the difference in their 
relative income diminishes (Kenney 2006). Yet, there are considerable country 
differences in the degree money is converted into other resources within families 
(Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al. 2011). In contexts of shared breadwinning, there is some 
evidence that the effects of spouses' relative income diminishes (Yodanis and Lauer 
2007b). For married couples, the likelihood one person manages all financial resources 
compared to jointly managing shared money decreases as breadwinner ideology 
dissipates at the country level (Yodanis and Lauer 2007a, 2007b). Couples living in the 
U.S. and Germany evaluate each partner’s financial contribution to the relationship, 
which can then be leveraged in negotiations about dividing domestic labor such as time 
spent on housework (Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al. 2011). For couples in Sweden and Spain, 
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money is rarely converted into other resources, either because money is considered a joint 
resource (Spain) or because money is kept separate, functioning outside of the 
relationship (Sweden) (Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al. 2011; Nyman and Reinikainen 2007). 
This study considers how relative resources influences money arrangements in 
contexts with varying levels of gender inequality. This approach is advantageous over 
previous studies because it reveals the preferred practices of couples who are most likely 
to be able to enact equal partnerships (couples with equal earnings or with women as 
primary-earners) and who live in countries that likely support and encourage egalitarian 
ideals. When the gap in relative earnings is large, couples living in countries with a 
strong commitment to gender equality may adopt the rhetoric of equal sharing without 
practicing equal money arrangements in actuality. In highly unequal gendered countries, 
couples with relatively equal earnings may not be able to enact ideals of egalitarianism, 
and thus may organize their finances differently than couples in more gender equal 
contexts. 
The Treatment of Money by Marital Status 
In societies where cohabitation is prevalent and institutionalized, cohabiting 
couples are presumed to treat their financial resources similarly to married couples, 
integrating their finances instead of keeping resources separate. Yet, findings show little 
or no cross-national difference in married and cohabiting couples’ level of integration of 
financial resources, with married couples more likely than cohabitors to pool money into 
a shared family pot in all contexts (Hamplová and Le Bourdais 2009; Hamplová et al. 
2014; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003; Kenney 2004, 2006; Lyngstad, Noack, and Tufte 
2011; Vogler, Brockmann, and Wiggins 2006). The nearly universal trend of lower levels 
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of integration of financial resources for cohabiting couples compared to married couples 
is surprising given the different national responses to rising levels of cohabitation. Even 
though Western Europe has seen increasing rates of cohabitation and declining marital 
rates, there has been little policy changes to address these demographic trends (Barlow 
2008). In contrast, Nordic countries such as Sweden and Norway have shifted tax policies 
and social security systems towards treating cohabitors increasingly like married couples 
(Barlow 2008; Lyngstad et al. 2011; Noack 2001). Notably, while cohabitors’ legal status 
becomes more like married couples in Norway, cohabiting couples still do not have a 
legal duty to provide for one another as married couples do (Lyngstad et al. 2011). 
Regardless of welfare regime (Esping-Andersen 1999), cohabiting couples tend to keep 
their money separate more often than married couples (Hamplová and Le Bourdais 
2009). 
One explanation could be that couples are simply unaware of the differing legal 
obligations and protections available to them at the national level. For example, many 
cohabiting couples in Britain falsely believe in the ‘common law marriage myth’ – that 
cohabiting couples have similar rights as married couples (Barlow 2008). If couples are 
simply unaware of their legal protections, we would expect to see financial integration 
among cohabiting couples mirror married couples behavior, regardless of the 
institutionalization of cohabitation in each society. In actuality, research shows all 
couples, regardless of marital status, are becoming more likely to withhold money from 
the common pot, meaning married couples behavior is changing in ways similar to 
cohabitors (Ashby and Burgoyne 2009; Burgoyne et al. 2006, 2007; Knudsen and 
Wærness 2009; Pahl 2005; Treas and Widmer 2000; Vogler et al. 2006). The trend in 
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withholding money from a common pot, even among married couples, further suggests 
that the lack of integration of financial resources of cohabitors is due to some other 
reason than a lack of investment in their relationships. 
A more likely explanation is that cohabitation operates with a different logic than 
marriage. Cohabiting couples tend to emphasize equal contributions to joint accounts and 
shun financial dependence (Bennett 2013; Elizabeth 2001). Marriage continues to be seen 
as a patriarchal institution, and the couples who choose to remain unwed in more gender 
equal societies may be the most likely to withhold some money from the common pot. 
There are two distinct theoretical predictions for cohabiting couples in gender unequal 
contexts. First, couples who remain unwed in gender unequal societies may be a highly 
selective group especially committed to gender equality, despite lacking any legal 
protection. Thus, we might expect to see a great difference in the proportion of married 
and cohabiting couples who keep some or all money separate. Alternatively, couples who 
cohabit in gender unequal societies may organize their finances more similarly to their 
married counterparts, emulating marriage to buffer the social norms already broken by 
not legally marrying. Thus, these couples may be as likely as married couples to pool 
financial resources, even if a greater proportion of cohabitors report equal management of 
their income than married couples. 
Methods 
Data and Sample 
I use data from the 2012 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) module on 
Changing Family and Gender Roles. The sample is limited to countries which 
differentiate between a legal marital status and whether respondents lived with a steady 
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partner (includes 28 countries) and countries with at least 20 cohabitors in order to ensure 
an adequate sample size (includes 22 countries). I exclude Canada from the analysis due 
to reported data inconsistencies in the original dataset (per the codebook) and eliminated 
South Africa because there was no data collected on attitudes about satisfaction with 
family life, an important influence on money organization (Addo and Sassler 2010). 
Thus, the resulting sample contains 20 countries: Argentina, Australia, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, 
Philippines, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Unites States, and Venezuela. Due to 
national differences in retirement practices that are linked with family structure and 
gender equality, I restrict the sample to respondents between 18 and 54 years old. The 
total analytic sample contains 4,955 respondents from 20 countries. The average sample 
size per country was 248 respondents, ranging from 125 people in Venezuela to 539 
people in Spain. 
Dependent Variable 
The primary dependent variable was adapted from the following survey question: 
“How do you and your spouse/ partner organize the income that one or both of you 
receive? Please choose the option that comes closest.” The answer choices are as follows: 
(1) I manage all and give my partner their share; (2) Partner manages all and gives me my 
share; (3) We pool all money, each take out; (4) We pool some money, rest separate; (5) 
We each keep own money separate; (6) My son or my daughter-in-law manage the 
money; (7) Don't know, refused; and (8) No answer. Answer choices 6-8 were dropped 
because they are not of primary interest to this study (less than 5% of the sample). In the 
analysis, I do not distinguish between which person solely manages the money because 
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earlier research indicates that women are disadvantaged whether they are the only 
manager of the money (occurs when income is limited and paying bills is stressful and a 
chore) and when men are the only manager (women then have little access to or control 
over financial resources) (Nyman 1999; Roman and Vogler 1999; Vogler and Pahl 1994). 
Thus, the dependent variable is a categorical indicator of the income organizational 
arrangement between partners: a) one money manager; b) jointly manage; c) pool some 
money and keep the rest separate; and d) keep all money separate.  
Predictor Variables 
This study has three primary predictor variables of interest. For each of the twenty 
countries, Table 2.1 shows the averages for the three key independent variables, country 
level gender inequality, average relative income, and marital status. First, to measure a 
country’s level of gender inequality, I used the Gender Inequality Index (GII), a measure 
from the Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program 
(Gaye et al. 2010). The higher the GII value the more disparities there are between 
women and men in a country. In this sample, the GII measure ranges from 3% 
(Switzerland) to 56% (India).  
Second, the relative income variable represents the size of the gap in contribution 
each partner contributes to the total household income. Due to data limitations and 
national differences in the sources of income for couples (Sani 2015), this study relies on 
a broad measure of income rather than focusing exclusively on earned income. 
Respondents were asked: “Considering all sources of income, between you and your 
spouse/ partner, who has the higher income?” Potential responses include: (1) My spouse/ 
partner has no income; (2) I have a much higher income; (3) I have a higher income; (4) 
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We have about the same income; (5)  My spouse/ partner has a higher income; (6) My 
spouse/ partner has a much higher income and (7) I have no income. Answer choices 
where one person has the sole income, a much higher or a higher income were combined. 
Using the respondents’ gender, answers were then collapsed into the following 
categories: male primary-earner; female primary-earner, and equal earners. Couples who 
report a solo earner may have qualitatively different dynamics of sharing income 
compared with dual earners because they, by definition, pool resources. In Appendix A, 
Table A.1, I show the full model results with a reduced sample (N = 4,155) restricted to 
dual-earners. These sensitivity results show the conclusions made in this paper remain 
largely the same. 
Marital status is the third independent variable of primary interest to this study. 
Couples were coded as married or cohabiting based on two survey questions. First, 
respondents were coded as married if they reported their current legal marital status was 
married or they were in a civil partnership. Respondents were also asked: “Do you have a 
spouse or a steady partner and, if yes, do you share the same household?” If they 
answered “Yes, have partner; live in same household” but they were not married, they 
were coded as cohabiting.  
Next, I detail the remaining independent variables that prior research suggests are 
associated with particular organizational systems (Burgoyne and Morison 1997; 
Elizabeth 2001; Pahl 1990; Singh and Lindsay 1996; Vogler 2005; Vogler and Pahl 
1993). Table 2.2 presents descriptive statistics of all model predictors to provide an 
overview of the analytical sample. 
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Female Report . I include the gender of the respondent to adjust for gender 
differences in perceptions of money arrangements. Men are coded as 0 and women are 
coded as 1. 
Age. Age is a continuous variable ranging from 18 to 54. On average, younger 
people hold less traditional family values compared to people who are older (Bolzendahl 
and Myers 2004). 
Parent. To address some selectivity issues between cohabitors and married 
couples, I consider presence of children an indicator of investment in the relationship 
(Barlow 2008; Kenney 2004). Respondents were coded as being a parent if they indicated 
they had any toddlers or children between school age and seventeen years of age living in 
their household. 
Employment. I use a categorical variable for respondents’ primary employment 
status: employment status: full-time employment (35+ hours a week), part-time 
employment, unemployment, student, and not in the labor force. 
Previous Homemaker Status. Respondents’ current financial situation may reflect 
life course variation in work and family arrangements, so I include a dichotomous 
variable indicating if the respondent (if female) or the respondent’s partner (if male) 
previously worked part-time or stayed at home when a child was under school age. 
Education. Previous research on income organization arrangements using ISSP 
data has not included a measure of absolute household income as a proxy for class, even 
though class does influence money organization within families (Hamplová and Le 
Bourdais 2009). Income measures are collected differently across countries (sometimes 
respondents are asked for gross income, other countries ask for net income) and a 
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significant number of respondents did not report income at all. Instead of trying to 
harmonize this data, I include education as a proxy indicator of class. The ISSP provides 
seven standardized educational categories across countries: (0) no formal education, (1) 
primary school/elementary school, (2) lower secondary, (3) upper secondary, (4) post 
secondary/non-tertiary, (5) lower level tertiary/first stage; and (6) upper level tertiary 
(Master, Dr.). 
Housework. ISSP asked respondents the following question: “In your household 
who does the following things ...?” Items included laundry, repairs, groceries, cleaning, 
meals, and care work. I excluded care work in the scale because there was lots of missing 
data on this item, as it was not asked of all respondents in multiple countries. Answers 
were reported on a six point scale: (1) Always me; (2) Usually me; (3) About equal or 
both together; (4) Usually my spouse/ partner; (5) Always my spouse/ partner; and (6) Is 
done by a third person. I combined “always me/always my spouse” and “usually 
me/usually my spouse” and paired the items with respondents’ gender to create three 
levels per activity: female higher (coded 1); about equal (coded 2); and male higher 
(coded 3). Each item was added together and the total was subtracted by five to create an 
index ranging from zero to ten. I use the alpha scoring method to create an index 
representing average division of labor from the five labor activities (Cronbach’s alpha = 
.57), with higher values indicating more favorable divisions of labor for women. 
Respondent’s Mother’s Work History. A dichotomous variable indicating if the 
respondent’s mother worked for at least one year after they were born and before they 
turned fourteen years old was also included because individuals whose mothers 
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participate in the labor force tend to hold more gender-egalitarian beliefs (Ciabattari 
2001; Davis and Robinson 1991). 
Happiness with Family Life. Respondents were asked “All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your family life?” Answer choices are on a seven point scale 
ranging from completely dissatisfied (coded 0) to completely satisfied (coded 6). 
Analytical Strategy 
I use a multinomial model because the outcome variable is categorical: one 
money manager, jointly manage pooled money, keep some money separate, and keep all 
money separate. First, I consider country level differences in organizational approaches, 
adjusting for the three primary predictor variables of interest (e.g. Gender Inequality 
Index, relative earnings of the couple, and couples’ marital status). The effects of 
couples’ relative earnings and marital status are measured using the characteristics of the 
analytical sample. Next, I add the individual characteristics found in previous research to 
be important in explaining the organization of money. I then test whether country level 
gender inequality moderates individual level variations associated with relative income 
and marital status. To ease interpretation of the results, figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the 
estimates from the regression-adjusted means. In other words, the figures show the 
predicted percentages of selecting each organizational approach, holding the other model 
variables constant. 
As a sensitivity test to adjust for potential unobserved country-level factors that 
may lead to respondents within countries being more alike in their financial management 
strategies than they are with respondents from other countries, I also conducted a 
multilevel, multinomial analysis (Appendix A, Table A.2). The assumption in this model 
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is that the individual level characteristics have constant effects, if any, across countries. 
The conclusions drawn from the multilevel model were similar to the models presented in 
the central text of this article.  
Results 
Figure 2.1 presents the proportion of each income organizational approach for 
each of the 20 countries in the sample. Table 2.3 (Model 1) depicts the bivariate statistics 
of the Gender Inequality Index (GII) and the income organizational approaches. The 
countries are shown in order from the least gender unequal country (Switzerland) to the 
country with the most gender inequality (India). Couples in all countries were most likely 
to report they pool all their resources and each take out what they need (Manage $ 
Together). Couples in the least gender equal countries were more likely to say one person 
managed the money. For example, the predicted probability that respondents in Chili and 
the Philippines reported they have one money manager was more than half in each 
country. The Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, and Sweden) had a higher percentage of 
couples who reported keeping some or all money separately. The predicted proportion of 
couples in India, Northern Europe (Ireland, France, and Germany), and the Nordic 
countries that reported they keep some money separate was higher than in other 
countries.  
In Model 2, I added the relative earnings of couples and in Model 3, I show the 
GII and marital status coefficients. The coefficients for the GII show that even with the 
addition of the couple-level relative earnings or marital status of the couples, in countries 
with high gender inequality, couples were still more likely to designate one money 
manager compared with jointly managing money. When women were the primary-
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earners or when couples’ earnings were about equal, couples were less likely to have one 
person manage the money than to share and jointly manage their earnings. As expected, 
cohabitors were more likely than married couples to keep some or all of their money 
separate. Interestingly, cohabiting couples were also more likely than married couples to 
designate one person the money manager for all shared money than to jointly manage 
pooled money. In general, the results were consistent with previous research findings and 
theoretical expectations that married couples would integrate their finances more than 
cohabiting couples.  
In Table 2.4, I add the remaining individual level predictor variables to the model. 
As seen in Model 4, the Gender Inequality Index (GII) remained a statistically significant 
predictor of the ways couples organize their earnings even with the addition of the 
individual level control variables. Couples living in countries with high gender inequality 
were less likely to manage money together compared to any of the other income 
arrangements. These country level results are consistent with prior research showing the 
gender climate at the nation level influences micro-level dynamics in families. In the full 
model, women’s primary-earnings were not statistically significantly different from the 
associations of men’s primary-earnings on income organizational arrangements. Equal 
earning configurations were associated with a decreased likelihood of having one money 
manager or keeping all money separate, compared to managing pooled money together. 
Marital status remained highly influential to how couples managed their money, even 
with the addition of the other control variables. Cohabitors were more likely than married 




I next turn to Model 5, which presents the interaction effect of the GII with the 
relative earnings of couples. For ease of interpretation, in Figure 2.2, I present the 
predicted proportion of each organizational arrangement, holding all the other model 
variables at their means. In high gender unequal countries, couples were more likely to 
report one person managed all pooled money, regardless of the relative income 
configuration. Relatedly, no matter their relative earnings, couples were more likely to 
say they jointly managed their pooled income in more gender equal countries than in 
countries with high gender inequality. Compared to equal earners, couples with unequal 
earnings were slightly more likely to keep all money separate in more highly unequal 
countries, although this arrangement was the least frequent organizational system for all 
couples in every context. This gap in keeping all money separate based on relative 
earnings diminished in more gender equal countries.  
As shown in Model 6, the interaction between GII and marital status was 
statistically significant for cohabiting couples withholding some or all money compared 
to jointly managing money. Figure 2.3 shows the predicted proportions of each income 
organizational arrangement along the GII (using the upper and lower bounds of the GII 
for the countries in the sample), holding all other model variables constant at their means. 
For both married and cohabiting couples, as gender inequality decreased, the proportion 
of couples who said one person managed the money decreased. How this arrangement 
was replaced differed depending on the marital status of the couples. In the most gender 
equal contexts, cohabitors were more than twice as likely as they were in the least equal 
contexts to keep their money separate. Similarly, as gender inequality decreased, the 
proportion of cohabiting couples expected to report sharing some but not all of the 
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income substantially increased. In contrast, the predicted proportion of married couples 
withholding some or all money remained mostly the same. Instead, married couples were 
more likely to say they jointly managed their pooled money as macro level gender 
inequality lessened. Thus, I find no evidence that cohabiting couples changed their 
behavior based on greater legal protections potentially available to them in the more 
equal countries, as they remained equally likely to pool money across contexts. These 
results were consistent with the argument that the ways egalitarian ideals are translated 
into practice within households was dependent on marital status. 
Discussion 
Cross-national variations in families’ money organization have focused primarily 
on differences in the institutionalization of cohabitation. Based on the literature on the co-
occurrence of changing marital patterns and the gender revolution, I argue that cross-
national research on money in families should consider how couples’ financial 
organizational systems are jointly influenced by changes in family formations and 
women’s standing in societies. Using data on 20 nations and 4,955 individuals, 
multinomial modeling showed all couples become less likely to have one money manager 
in countries with greater gender equality, no matter the relative earnings of couples. 
Married couples jointly managed their integrated finances in more gender equal countries 
while cohabitors integrate some but not all of their finances. The results suggest that 
changing marital patterns are potentially more influential to how money is allocated 
within families in the future than further gains in women’s economic status. 
One goal of this study was to examine the allocation of earnings in couples most 
likely to be able to enact equal partnerships – couples with equal earnings or women as 
31 
 
primary-earners, living in countries with the least amount of gender inequality. 
Interestingly, these findings show little evidence that the interaction of relative earnings 
and country level gender inequality were a primary driver in how couples distributed 
their earnings. Equal-earning and female-breadwinning couples had remarkably similar 
organizational arrangements as male-breadwinner families in both gender unequal and 
more gender equal countries. Couples in all relative-earning circumstances were most 
likely to report that they pooled their money and each took out what they needed in 
countries with less gender inequality. Gender unequal countries had a larger proportion of 
couples reporting that one person managed the shared pot of money compared to more 
gender equal countries, especially when men were the primary earner. There was little to 
no difference in the proportion of couples who kept some or all money separate, 
regardless of the relative earnings of the couples or country level gender inequality. In 
other words, the results showed little evidence that couples most able to enact gender 
egalitarian relationships (e.g., equal-earners or women primary-earners) organized their 
finances differently than male-breadwinner couples, even in different gendered climates. 
What remains unclear is if couples living in countries with a strong commitment to 
gender equality only adopted the rhetoric of equal sharing without practicing equal 
money arrangements in actuality. That is to say, what looks similar at the aggregate level 
could actually function quite differently within couples’ relationships. 
A second goal of this study was to examine the joint influence of gender 
inequality and family structure on couples’ income organization approach. Married 
couples continued to pool their money in more gender equal countries, but reported joint 
management instead of one money manager then when country level gender inequality 
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was high. Counter to theoretical predictions that cohabiting couples in highly gender 
unequal countries may be a highly selective group especially committed to gender 
equality, married and cohabiting couples financial arrangements were largely similar in 
contexts of high gender inequality. However, in less gender unequal countries, 
cohabitors’ income organization arrangements were more diverse than married couples. 
Cohabiting couples were more likely to report they kept some or all of their income 
separately in more gender equal contexts, compared to gender unequal contexts. 
These findings were consistent with evidence that cohabiting couples emphasize 
equal relationships over financial dependence (Bennett 2013; Elizabeth 2001). Thus, 
money in cohabiting partnerships may operate with different dynamics than the cultural 
logics called upon within marriage, suggesting cohabitation is not simply a weaker form 
of marriage but rather an alternative family arrangement. In more gender equal contexts, 
marriage may be viewed as a patriarchal choice, representing greater financial 
dependency than expected by couples who forgo marriage. Although the data analyzed in 
this study are cross-sectional and thus unable to address causation, the findings suggest 
the interaction between dissipating gender inequality at the nation level and the decline of 
marriage may be important drivers in the trend in withholding some money from the 
common family pot. The weak association between relative earnings and the 
heterogeneity of couples’ approaches to sharing income was consistent with prior 
scholarship (Blumstein and Schwartz 1991; Yodanis and Lauer 2007b). These findings 
challenge the popular assumption that the gender revolution is associated with reduced 
investment in marital relationships. It also suggests that focusing solely on changing 
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marital patterns or separately on gender inequality fails to adequately explain how 
sociopolitical contexts influence the allocation of money within families.  
This study is not without limitations. As with all cross-national research, the study 
design may be limited by omitting other variables that may be particularly important in 
some countries and comparative research always risks nonequivalence in measurement 
approaches across diverse climates (Yu 2015). For example, pooling all money may 
mean one thing to respondents taking the survey in India and quite another to survey 
respondents in Germany. Although the use of the GII was purposefully selected to 
minimize some of the trouble with omitted nation level variables, the GII also suffers 
from measuring some forms of inequality at the expense of others (Permanyer 2013). 
Replication studies with other measurements of the gender climate of countries are 
important to fully understanding how changes in gender inequality at the macro level 
moderate family level outcomes. 
It may be beneficial to further explore the ways other individual level 
characteristics, such as gender attitudes and relationship duration, interact with national 
variation in gender inequality. Attitudes about working mothers and relationship duration 
are also likely important predictors of how couples organize their money, though these 
indicators were not included in this analysis. Although many countries asked respondents 
about their beliefs about working mothers (“A working mother can establish just as warm 
and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work,” and “A 
preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works,” Spain did not. The United 
States only asked married respondents about their relationship duration and the 
Philippines did not ask about relationship duration at all. In order to use the data from as 
34 
 
many nations as possible, I decided to exclude these predictors. It might also be 
beneficial to focus exclusively on dual-earner couples and further distinguish between 
types of income. The U.S. did not ask cohabiting couples about their partner’s 
employment status or work hours, so I did not restrict the sample to employed couples. 
Additionally, teasing apart the influence of national differences in the sources of income 
for couples may better capture the ways gender dynamics influence income organization 
(Sani 2015). 
Nonetheless, comparative research is especially suited for answering questions of 
how cultural context, in this case country level gender inequality, moderates family level 
associations (Yu 2015). I find support for the need to consider both changes in family 
formations and women’s status in society to explain intrahousehold finances. Couples’ 
relative income was important to how money was managed in families, but the larger 
context of gender inequality also was associated with variation in income organization 
approaches. Future empirical work is needed for further understanding how changes in 
the family intersect with the larger context of changing gender norms. While I can only 
speculate, it may be that the legal regulations of marriage makes pooling all resources in 
high egalitarian countries less risky for married couples, while cohabitors keep some 
money separate as a way to protect individual interests. It is also possible that couples 
who marry in more egalitarian countries may incorporate rhetoric of equal sharing but the 
organization of money may still fail to live up to expressions of equality in reality (Addo 
and Sassler 2010; Bisdee, Daly, and Price 2013; Burgoyne 1990; Burgoyne and Lewis 
1994; Burgoyne and Morison 1997; Kenney 2006). Thus, those who choose to 
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indefinitely cohabit may be couples with a stronger commitment to gender equality 





















India 0.56 0.67 0.26 0.07 0.15 204 
Venezuela 0.46 0.65 0.13 0.22 0.11 125 
Philippines 0.41 0.79 0.12 0.08 0.16 265 
Argentina 0.38 0.74 0.13 0.13 0.35 133 
Chile 0.36 0.74 0.13 0.14 0.29 246 
US 0.26 0.69 0.23 0.07 0.20 227 
Latvia 0.22 0.62 0.21 0.17 0.13 218 
Poland 0.14 0.66 0.19 0.14 0.09 201 
Lithuania 0.12 0.62 0.12 0.26 0.07 256 
Ireland 0.11 0.62 0.22 0.15 0.11 178 
Australia 0.11 0.65 0.18 0.17 0.27 203 
Spain 0.10 0.61 0.19 0.19 0.11 539 
Iceland 0.09 0.69 0.14 0.17 0.07 201 
Czech 
Republic 0.09 0.64 0.08 0.28 0.16 427 
France 0.08 0.57 0.18 0.24 0.24 385 
Finland 0.07 0.56 0.21 0.23 0.36 239 
Norway 0.07 0.67 0.17 0.17 0.25 266 
Sweden 0.05 0.62 0.24 0.14 0.36 187 
Germany 0.05 0.67 0.18 0.15 0.28 255 
Switzerland 0.03 0.71 0.23 0.06 0.26 200 
All 0.17 0.65 0.17 0.17 0.20 4,955 
Note: Countries are in order of most gender inequality to least gender inequality
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Table 2.2 Means and Standard Deviations of Individual-level Predictors 
Variable Means S.D.     
Female Report 0.52    
Age  41.08 (8.75)   
Parent 0.60    
Employment     
 Full-time 0.75    
 Part-time 0.01    
 Unemployed 0.08    
 Student 0.02    
 Not in labor force 0.13    
Homemaker 0.38    
Education     
 No formal education 0.03    
 Primary school 0.04    
 Lower secondary 0.18    
 Upper secondary 0.27    
 Post-secondary 0.17    
 Lower level tertiary 0.15    
 Upper level tertiary 0.16    
Housework 3.58 (1.91)   
Mother’s Work History 0.67    
Happiness with Family Life 5.38 (0.79)     
Note: All variables except for age, housework, and happiness are 
presented as percentages. n = 4,955 





Table 2.3 Multinomial Regression: Relative Risk Ratios of Income Organization Arrangement (Ages 18-54) 
204.94 *** 0.82 7.06 191.76 *** 0.84 6.97 215.89 *** 0.96 8.24
(191.63) (1.13) (13.91) (174.81) (1.16) (13.46) (199.58) (1.42) (17.25)
Female higher earner 0.76
** 1.33 ** 1.41 **
(0.08) (0.12) (0.17)
About equal earnings 0.59
* 1.22 1.01
(0.13) (0.13) (0.11)
1.71 ** 3.98 *** 5.38 ***
(0.28) (0.78) (1.07)
0.16 *** 0.40 ** 0.18 *** 0.19 *** 0.36 *** 0.17 *** 0.15 *** 0.29 *** 0.12 ***








(Male higher earner ref.)
Gender Inequality Index
SOURCE: International Social Survey Programme 2012 (Ages 18-54);  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test)
Baseline category is Joint Management; Standard errors adjusted for 20 nation clusters


















Table 2.4 Multinomial Regression: Relative Risk Ratios of Income Organization Arrangement with Control Variables (N = 4,955) 




















Level 2 Variable                                     
Gender Inequality Index 113.76 *** 2.73  
13.68 
 
191.25 *** 3.46 
 22.49 
 
124.40 *** 8.15  
35.06 ** 
Level 1 Variables                                     
Earnings Homogamy  
(Male primary-earner ref.)                   



















 About equal earnings 
0.63 * 0.99  





0.63 * 0.97  
0.78 * 
Earnings Homogamy x GII                   






       
 About equal earnings       
0.08 * 0.32  
0.12 **       
Cohabitation 1.56 ** 3.38 *** 4.54 *** 1.55 ** 3.38 *** 4.51 *** 1.46  
7.38 *** 9.14 *** 
Cohabiting x GII             
0.51 
 
0.00 *** 0.01 *** 















Age 0.99  
0.98 * 0.99 
 0.99  0.98 * 0.99  
0.99 
 
0.98 * 0.99  






































0.52 ** 0.50 *** 1.27  
0.52 ** 0.50 *** 1.27  






2.40 ** 2.10  
0.88 
 




 Not in labor force 
1.43 * 0.46 *** 0.64  
1.42 * 0.46 *** 0.64  
1.42 * 0.47 *** 0.67  
Homemaker 1.18  
0.84 
 







Education (Upper sec. is ref)                  





2.47 * 1.08  
1.27 
 




































































1.98 *** 0.75  
1.28 
 




 Upper level tertiary 
0.55 ** 1.75 *** 1.72  
0.55 ** 1.75 *** 1.73  
0.55 ** 1.75 *** 1.73  
Housework 0.87 *** 1.01  
1.09 ** 0.87 *** 1.01  
1.09 ** 0.87 *** 1.01  
1.08 * 

















Happy with Family Life 0.79 * 0.80 *** 0.59 *** 0.78 * 0.80 *** 0.59 *** 0.78 * 0.80 *** 0.59 *** 

















BIC 11,121 11,109 11,060 
SOURCE: International Social Survey Programme 2012 (Ages 18-54); Standard errors adjusted for 20 nation clusters 








Figure 2.2 Predictive Proportion of each Organizational Approach by Couple Level 





Figure 2.3. Predictive Proportion of Each Organizational Approach by Marital Status and 






CHAPTER THREE: BELIEFS ABOUT MONEY IN FAMILIES: BALANCING 
FAMILY UNITY, AUTONOMY, AND GENDER EQUALITY 
Abstract 
Using original data from a nationally representative vignette-survey experiment (n = 
3,986), this study investigated beliefs about income sharing within families. Respondents 
selected an income allocation strategy for a fictional couple with varied circumstances. 
Findings showed widespread support for collectivist approaches to money. Nearly 70% of 
respondents preferred some level of financial integration for married and cohabiting 
couples alike. Still, the majority of respondents indicated all couples should pursue some 
level of autonomy within their relationships. Respondents also believed higher-earning 
partners ought to hold back a greater absolute value of their income, potentially 
reproducing unequal labor market conditions within families. When women were 
presented as the primary earner, the preferred level of withholding income was slightly 
larger in magnitude than when men were shown as the primary earner. Findings suggest 
the pursuit of financial autonomy, in combination with attitudes about gender, are 





Two contradictions related to the ways couples share money are commonly 
studied. First, couples must reconcile the conflict between their commitment to their 
collective family units and their desires for individual autonomy (Treas 1993; Vogler, 
Brockmann, and Wiggins 2008). Second, many couples struggle to create equality in the 
home given inequalities prevalent in the labor market (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; 
Burgoyne 1990; Pahl 1989; Treas 1993; Vogler, Brockmann, et al. 2008). To understand 
how these contradictions are reconciled within American families, researchers initially 
focused on grouping systems of money arrangements into analytical categories (Ashby 
and Burgoyne 2008; Pahl 1995). Thereafter, many have searched for possible 
explanations for the prevalence of various categories and sought to identify the 
consequences of these arrangements (Bennett 2013).  
Conclusions about how people reconcile these competing cultural values that are 
inferred from couples’ behavioral practices may be partial or even misleading (Ashby and 
Burgoyne 2008, 2009). People tend to be particularly bad at consistently explaining their 
own behavior (Swidler 2001; Vaisey 2009). Behaviors also tend to reflect a mixture of 
attitudes, circumstance, and other factors (Cherlin 2009). An approach that elicits 
individuals’ opinions about other people’s families may reflect cultural values better than 
assessments of their own family behavior. Couples’ treatment of money may also not 
fully reflect individuals’ values because partners with less bargaining power may not be 
able to implement their preferred arrangements (Lennon and Rosenfield 1994). 
Additionally, teasing apart behaviors that were adopted with purpose and those that are 
taken on for convenience or as a result of temporary or unexpected circumstances is 
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challenging using surveys of behavior (Addo 2017; Treas 1993). Moreover, couples’ 
financial practices generally remain unchanged throughout the duration of their 
relationships, making their behavior a lagging indicator of current beliefs about the 
appropriate treatment of money (Bisdee et al. 2013). 
This article contributes to the literature by evaluating beliefs about money sharing 
in families, which may reflect how people reconcile competing modern cultural values 
(Ridgeway 2011; Vaisey 2009). A stream of qualitative research using non-representative 
samples documents the significance of non-economic mechanisms for the treatment of 
money in families, such as attitudes about families and gender dynamics (Ashby and 
Burgoyne 2008; Bennett 2013; Zelizer 1989). For this study, I devised a novel vignette-
survey experiment to collect the first nationally representative sample of U.S. adults’ 
beliefs about income sharing in families. Survey respondents were presented with a 
vignette of a fictional couple that varied in marital and parental status, relationship 
duration, and relative incomes, and then asked how the fictional couple should allocate 
their income. This survey method is valuable for understanding the conditions under 
which someone might prioritize one cultural value over another (Cerulo 2014; DiMaggio 
2014; Swidler 1986). The research design also allowed for artificial variation of the 
environment, such as inflating the disparity in income between high-earning women and 
low-earning men (Mutz 2011). Doing so facilitates the examination of attitudes under 
contexts that might otherwise be difficult to study given their relative rarity. 
This article also addresses a secondary limitation in the existing research on the 
allocation of money in families. Prior studies measuring financial approaches generally 
disregarded the gradations of survey response categories “keeping some money separate” 
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and “keeping all money separate,” choosing instead to study a dichotomous difference of 
“pooling all money” or “not pooling all money” (see Hamplová and Le Bourdais, 2009 
for an exception). Focusing on response variations that express income separation is 
important to understanding the crossroads between the family domain’s emphasis on 
interdependence and the market domain’s emphasis on self-reliance (Bellah et al. 2008; 
Yodanis and Lauer 2014). Pooling some, but not all, money may be endorsed because it 
facilitates the redistribution of income while simultaneously allowing continued control 
over some individual money. Separate and collective income distribution arrangements 
exist on a continum, which warrants careful interpretation (Ashby and Burgoyne 2009; 
Burgoyne 2008). This article examines attitudes about shades of financial integration, 
treating partial pooling as a separate allocation strategy, and considers the gradation of 
financial integration. 
Next, I review theories on the ways various configurations of families might be 
expected to treat money. These expectations are used to develop hypotheses about when 
people prioritize family unity, evidenced by support for integrating finances, compared 
with when they might prioritize autonomy in relationships, evidenced by supporting 
separated money systems. Then, I draw on theories of bargaining power and exchange to 
generate hypotheses about perceptions of entitlement to individual ownership of earned 
income. 
Background and Hypotheses 
Family Unity versus Economic Autonomy 
A family unity approach to relationships is characterized by values of family 
member solidarity, which prioritizes shared goals over individual pursuits, in part through 
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the sharing of family resources (Addo and Sassler 2010; Bellah et al. 2008). This 
collectivized approach to financial arrangements is thought to occur under three 
conditions: 1) exchanges are repeated and continuing; 2) investments in the relationship 
that cannot be recovered have already taken place; and 3) evaluating repeated exchanges 
is costly (Treas 1993; Williamson 1975). Accordingly, couples who have greater 
relationship investments, such as a public marriage commitment, long relationship 
duration, or children together are expected to prioritize family unity over economic 
autonomy, adopting collectivist money arrangements such as establishing joint bank 
accounts. I disentangle the extent to which marital status, relationship duration, and 
parental status influence support for collective approaches to family finances. 
Legal protections provided to married couples and expectations about the 
longevity of the relationship are thought to increase married couples’ financial integration 
levels (Burgoyne et al. 2010; Desai 1992; Treas 1993). Thus, we might expect greater 
support for married couples’ integration of their finances compared with cohabiting 
couples (Hypothesis 1). Yet, cohabiting couples are heterogeneous. Rather than being 
less committed than married couples, some cohabitors are taking a step towards marriage, 
or seeking a replacement for marriage altogether. About two-thirds of marriages are 
preceded by cohabitation and cohabiting couples planning to marry are more likely to 
integrate their finances compared with cohabitors without intentions to legally wed 
(Addo 2017; Manning 2013). If these factors are considered in evaluations of money 
sharing, there may not be adequate evidence to support Hypothesis 1 and the null 
hypothesis, a no-difference hypothesis, will fail to be rejected. 
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Although cohabiting couples typically either terminate their relationship or marry 
within three years, some couples cohabit for long durations without an intention to marry 
(Bumpass and Lu 2000; Goodwin, Mosher, and Chandra 2010; Manning and Smock 
2002). Like married couples, cohabitors may share financial resources in part to minimize 
transaction costs, such as the need to negotiate and monitor the use of funds (Oropesa, 
Landale, and Kenkre 2003; Treas 1993). Therefore, it may be seen as desirable for long-
time cohabitors to integrate some financial resources, similar to married couples. Longer 
relationship durations of married couples may also elicit greater support for financial 
integration, as the perception of the stability of the relationship increases. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2a suggests that support for sharing money will be greater for couples in 
long-term relationships than couples in short-term relationships, no matter their 
relationship status. Alternatively, the relationship duration may only matter when the 
stability of the partnership is questionable, such as for couples who have not legally 
committed to a partnership through marriage (Hypothesis 2b). 
Parenting may also signal a long-term, collective interest. Behavioral evidence 
reveals parents act more alike than non-parents, no matter their marital status (Barlow 
2008; Kenney 2004; Lyngstad et al. 2011; Vogler, Brockmann, et al. 2008). A majority 
of non-marital births now occur in cohabiting unions and parenthood has become 
increasingly uncoupled from marriage, except among college graduates (Lundberg and 
Pollak 2014). It remains unclear if cohabiting parents integrate finances because of 
similar beliefs in family unity at the time co-parenting begins or whether joining finances 
reflects practical considerations, such as protecting against financial hardships (Addo 
2014). Some evidence indicates parenthood may be the key family transition in which 
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people consider financial integration to be appropriate (Barlow 2008). Thus, Hypothesis 
3a is that support for sharing money will be greater for parents than for non-parents, 
regardless of marital status. It is an open empirical question whether the effects of marital 
and parental status are additive—that is, are married parents evaluated as having the most 
interdependent relationships (Hypothesis 3b). 
Although the marriage contract requires financial support of spouses and 
presumes treatment of the family as a single economic unit, people earn money in the 
labor market as individuals (Burgoyne 1990; Burgoyne and Lewis 1994; Nyman and 
Reinikainen 2007). Even when income is thought of as a collective resource (as is legally 
enforceable in the case of marriage), partners remain cognizant of how money is earned 
and engage in mental accounting—earmarking and distinguishing between different 
kinds of money (Barlow 2008; Burgoyne 1990; Burgoyne et al. 2006; Burgoyne and 
Lewis 1994) (Burgoyne 1990; Burgoyne et al. 2006; Burgoyne and Lewis 1994). 
Additionally, with later transitions into marriage, people bring their own bank accounts, 
debt, and financial habits into their new family units. Decreasing stigmatization of 
divorce has increased uncertainty about the permanency of marriage and a belief in 
entitlement to personal autonomy does not necessarily vanish upon marriage (Bittman et 
al. 2003).  
Thus, support for couples fully sharing financial resources, married or otherwise, 
may not be universally or even overwhelmingly endorsed today. It may be expected that 
families seen as highly unified (i.e., married parents) will elicit lower levels of support 
for separate earnings compared with couples viewed as less unified, but even in these 
scenarios, keeping some money separate may still be supported. I expect that at least 
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some economic autonomy will have wide support across the various couple 
configurations. 
Equality and Gender 
Couples confront discordance between beliefs in fair partnerships and entitlement 
to individual ownership of income earned in the labor market (Bennett 2013; Elizabeth 
2001). When income is seen as a personal asset, exchange and dependency theories 
predict the interests of the higher earner are likely to prevail (Baxter and Kane 1995; 
Brines 1994). Whichever partner is most dependent on the relationship is also thought to 
have the weaker bargaining position, and therefore might be seen as less entitled to 
economic autonomy compared with the primary earner. For instance, higher-earning 
individuals in couples—overwhelmingly men—tend to have the last word about family 
financial decisions and more often spend nominally shared money without consulting 
their partners (Burgoyne et al. 2006). As the difference in men’s and women’s incomes 
has diminished, women have gained influence in family decision making and increased 
control of family money (Belch and Willis 2002; Kenney 2006). In accord with the 
ostensibly gender-neutral nature of exchange theory, attending to the interests of the 
higher earner might result in support for either men’s or women’s greater entitlement to 
economic autonomy when they are the higher earner. To test this, I evaluated whether the 
amount of money to be withheld from a shared pot is greater for the primary earner in the 
fictional couple (Hypothesis 4). 
Next, I detail two conflicting gender-specific arguments using exchange and 
dependency theories. On the one hand, conservative beliefs about appropriate gender 
behavior may constrain support for women’s economic autonomy but not men’s 
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autonomy. Whereas men appear to pay themselves first, such as treating bonuses as their 
own money, women’s discretionary spending is often contingent on the family’s financial 
needs (Tichenor 1999; Zelizer 1989). Primary-earning wives do not translate their higher-
earning status into power—such as gaining equitable divisions of unpaid labor and 
entitlement to decision making—to the same extent as men. Thus, it may follow that 
women’s higher relative earnings are insufficient to elicit agreement that women are 
entitled to personal spending money. Women’s earnings tend to be treated differently 
than men’s earnings, earmarked for childcare and housekeeping expenses (Burgoyne 
1990; Zelizer 1989). It may be the case that women’s income is assumed to be a resource 
that benefits the whole family (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997; Phipps and Burton 
1998). Therefore, the goal of economic autonomy may be less salient when women are 
presented as the primary earner than when men are shown to be the primary earner 
(Hypothesis 5a). 
On the other hand, there are two contradictory reasons we might expect greater 
support for women’s economic autonomy than men’s. First, expectations for men to 
contribute financially to the common pot remain strong (Townsend 2002). Imagery of a 
family wage, wherein men earn enough money to support their wife and children without 
women needing a job, may bolster the idea of men’s earnings going into a common pot 
and dilute support for men’s economic autonomy. An acceptance of women in the labor 
force does not necessarily translate into all couples desiring equal financial partnerships, 
as some couples prefer men to be the primary earner (Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan 2015; 
Milkie et al. 2002). Perceptions of economic autonomy may also be conditional on 
marital and parental status because conventional marriage and fatherhood combine ideals 
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of male dominance with male breadwinning (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; Townsend 
2002). Consequently, men may not be perceived as needing to withhold money from a 
common pot to retain control over their earnings. 
Second, some modern couples withhold money from a common pot as a tactic to 
ensure women have access to and control over money (Elizabeth 2001). Most couples 
express a desire for equality in their relationships (Gerson 2009; Pedulla and Thébaud 
2015). In partnerships where a woman’s income is sufficient to support herself and her 
partner holds less conventional beliefs about gender, couples are more likely to take a 
partial-pooling approach, combining some but not all of their earnings (Vogler et al. 
2006). An analysis of same-sex couples showed these couples also tended to keep some 
money separate as a way to facilitate equality within their relationships (Burns et al. 
2008). For these reasons, vignette-survey respondents may indicate women, more so than 
men, should withhold money from the common pot in order to maintain control over their 
earnings (Hypothesis 5b). 
In summary, the current study departs from prior research by using a vignette-
survey experiment to evaluate beliefs about income sharing within families. This research 
design is advantageous for teasing apart the conditions under which someone might 
prioritize family unity over economic autonomy (Cerulo 2014; DiMaggio 2014; Swidler 
1986). The research design was informed by theories of collectivized approaches to 
money sharing compared with autonomous approaches to financial resources. It also used 
bargaining power and exchange theories to develop predictions about perceptions of 
entitlement to ownership of income. Building from the theoretical perspectives and 
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previous research described, I summarize hypotheses about views of couples’ 
organization of money in Table 3.1. 
Methods 
Data and Experimental Design 
To test these hypotheses, I used original data from a nationally representative 
dataset collected by GfK, funded by Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences 
(http://www.tessexperiments.org) (Freese and Druckman 2016). Respondents were 
recruited by GfK using probability-based sampling of U.S. addresses and were provided 
with equipment for internet access, if needed, to participate. This study was fielded in 
July and August 2016 on a random sub-set of GfK panelists, resulting in a total sample 
size of 4,020 respondents. Thirty-one respondents failed to answer the primary question 
of interest for the analysis (see Dependent Variables sub-section) and three respondents 
selected a partial-pooling approach for the fictional couple, but in a follow-up question 
divided the earnings into an all-individual or an all-shared approach. These respondents 
were dropped from the analyses for a total analytic sample size of 3,986 respondents. 
Respondents were asked to evaluate the income-organizing strategies of couples 
in fictional vignettes. The vignette design used a two-by-two-by-two-by-three factorial 
design, resulting in 24 different vignettes (summarized in Figure 3.1)2. The fictional 
couple differed by marital and parental status, relationship duration, and relative earnings. 
Roughly equal numbers of respondents (315–348 respondents) viewed each of the 24 
vignettes. Respondents were told that they would view a hypothetical scenario and be 
                                                 
2 The full vignette instrument is provided in Appendix B. 
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asked to give their opinion on how a couple should handle money. For example, the 
married parents, three-year relationship duration, man as primary earner vignette is 
shown here (italics show vignette manipulation):  
Michelle and Anthony, both 31 years old, are married and have been a couple 
for 3 years. They enjoy spending time together and they are happy with their 
relationship. They have one child together. Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Anthony earns $2,800 a month while Michelle earns 
$1,200 a month. 
 
I manipulated the marital and parental status to test variation in perceptions of 
family unity. The relationship duration in the vignette was manipulated to adjust for 
influences related to the longevity of the relationship. The fictional couple was presented 
as being together for either three or seven years. The three-year duration represents the 
point in the life course of relationships that was expected to elicit the greatest perception 
of differences in family unity between cohabiting and married couples while still 
conveying some level of stability. Adding the seven-year relationship duration to the 
vignette tested this assumption and still allowed the presented ages of the couple to be 
plausible. The total household earnings were based on analysis of median total household 
income ($53,657) calculated from the 2014 American Community Survey (DeNavas-
Walt and Proctor 2015). This estimate was rounded down to make comparisons of 
earnings more interpretable for respondents and to represent the lower earner as making 
just over the federal minimum wage. The gap between the man’s share and the woman’s 
share of the family’s earned income was manipulated to show either a primary earner or 
an equal earning scenario. By varying whether the primary earner was a man or woman, I 
tested whether beliefs in economic autonomy were conditional on gender. 
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To address potentially confounding variables, other characteristics of the fictional 
couple were indicated and held constant across all vignettes. Couples were presented as 
each working 40 hours a week, the most common employment arrangement for couples 
in which both are employed and as a way to hold constant the hours spent in paid labor 
for each partner. The couple was also described as 31 years of age, slightly above the 
average age of marriage and the average age for first births (Cohen 2018). This age is 
advantageous for comparing first marriages and cohabitation, theoretically important to 
understanding demographic trends in family formations (Cherlin 2009). This age is also 
less encumbered with potentially unintended assumptions related to later life stages (e.g., 
likelihood of prior investments, approaching retirement, remarriage, obligations to 
children from previous relationships, and financial support to aging parents). Racially 
neutral names, Anthony and Michelle, were selected by choosing the most popular shared 
names for Black and White babies born in this age range (Lieberson 2000). Pilot tests of 
the vignette showed most respondents assumed the couple’s racial identity was either 
White or the same as their own race. 
Dependent Variables 
There are two dependent variables in this analysis. First, I used evaluations of 
bank account ownership as a measure of how income should be distributed between 
partners. This measure was adapted from behavioral indicators of how couples organize 
their finances, which is used in surveys such as the International Social Survey Program, 
Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, and the National Longitudinal Study of 
Adolescent Health (Brooks-Gunn et al. 2011; Harris et al. 2009; ISSP Research Group 
2014). After presenting the fictional couple, respondents were informed that couples 
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organize their income in many different ways and were then asked: “Do you think 
Michelle and Anthony should: (a) Have a shared account in which they both deposit all 
their earned income; (b) Keep all their earned income in separate, individual accounts; or 
(c) Have both a shared account and separate, individual accounts?”  
Selection of the (a) shared account was used as an indicator of a unitary family 
interest, as both individuals in the couple are expected to deposit their income into this 
account and all expenses, joint and individual, will thus be withdrawn from this account. 
Selecting answer choice (b)—in which each person should have their own individual 
accounts and no joint account—indicated that money was perceived to be a personal 
resource, as earnings remain individually accessed and controlled and the couple consists 
of two separate financial entities. Respondents who selected option (c), having both a 
shared and individual account, are subsequently referred to as selecting the “partial-
pooling” option. Thus, this dependent variable includes three categories: shared account, 
separate account, and both accounts. 
The second dependent variable applies to respondents who selected the partial-
pooling option. These respondents were asked to determine how much money Michelle 
and Anthony should each put in their individual accounts and in a shared account. The 
survey required the total amounts to be summed to the manipulated income presented for 
each person in the vignette. Therefore, this dependent variable is continous. I transformed 
the dependent variable from the dollar amounts allocated into each account (e.g., his, 
hers, and shared) into proportions of the total household income so that the denominator 
($4,000) was held steady across the relative earnings manipulations. Because this 
dependent variable was transformed into a proportion, in addition to the analyses 
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presented in this article, I also estimated a generalized linear model with the logit link 
and the binomial family. Comparisons of the models showed the conclusions presented 
here remain the same regardless of the model. 
Predictor Variables 
The primary predictor variables of interest are the categorical vignette conditions: 
marital and parental status, relationship duration, and relative earnings. In order to test 
Hypothesis 1, 3a, and 3b, I combined the vignette couple’s marital and parental status, 
allowing for simultaneous evaluation of whether respondents treat cohabitation as a 
similar condition to marriage and whether parental status influences this comparison. 
This method results in four possible categories: cohabiting non-parents, cohabiting 
parents, married non-parents, and married parents. To test Hypothesis 2, the relationship 
duration is included as a dichotomous variable (three years or five years). To test 
Hypothesis 4, 5a, and 5b, the relative earnings variable included three categories: man 
primary earner, equal earners, and woman primary earner. For all analyses, the reference 
category is cohabiting non-parents who have been together for three years with the man 
as primary earner. 
Respondents were randomly assigned to a vignette condition, so demographic 
controls are not necessary in the statistical models (Maxwell and Delaney 2004; Mutz 
2011). A check of the correlations between vignette variables and key respondent 
variables confirmed no statistical significance between the vignette manipulations and 
respondent characteristics. Nevertheless, for theoretical reasons, I included predictor 
variables that prior literature shows are associated with behavioral differences in the ways 
people report organizing income within families. These include gender (Pahl 1995), 
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marital status (Burgoyne and Morison 1997), parental status (Lyngstad et al. 2011), age 
(Vogler and Pahl 1994), race-ethnicity (Addo and Sassler 2010; Kenney 2004), education 
(Treas 1993), employment status (Kenney 2006), and income (Copp et al. 2016). Table 
3.2 shows the means for the sample. Analyses without the demographic controls show the 
same conclusions as those presented here. 
Analyses 
First, I used multinomial logistic regression, selected because the first dependent 
measure is nominal and contains more than two categories (i.e., shared, separate, partial-
pooling). In analysis not shown, the Wald test for combining alternatives revealed that 
each of the three income-organizing approaches were distinct categories. Additionally, 
the Hausman test showed the model does not violate the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives assumption (Hausman and McFadden 1984). Due to the experimental design, 
there are minimal differences between analyses that control for respondent characteristics 
and those that do not; averages of respondent demographic characteristics are available in 
Appendix C. In the results section, I start by discussing the effects of the vignette 
manipulations on selecting an allocation strategy for the fictional couple. 
Second, for the sub-sample of respondents who selected the partial-pooling 
option, I estimated ordinary least squares regression models to evaluate differences in the 
amount of income they believe should be distributed between shared use and individual 
accounts. To ease interpretation of the results, Figures 2–4 show the estimates from the 
regression-adjusted means. In other words, the figures show the predicted percentages of 
selecting each organizational approach and the total household income to be deposited in 
his, hers, and shared accounts after accounting for the other vignette manipulations and 
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variation in the respondents’ demographic characteristics. All results are presented 
without using analytical weights; in analyses not shown, results remained the same when 
modeled with the weights.  
Results 
Support for collectivized approaches to financial arrangements were expected to 
be influenced by perceptions of couples’ relationship investments, such as marriage, 
relationship duration, and parenthood (Hypotheses 1–3). The effects of these vignette 
manipulations on selecting an allocation strategy for the fictional couple, adjusting for the 
other model variables, are shown in Table 3.3. The statistically significant coefficients for 
marital and parental status indicated respondents were less likely to select either separate 
accounts or a partial-pooling option for fictional couples depicted as married or parents, 
consistent with Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 3a, and Hypothesis 3b. 
Greater support for the financial integration of the fictional couple was also 
indicated when the relationship duration of the fictional couple was longer (Hypothesis 
2a). When the fictional couple was presented as together for seven years compared with 
three years, respondents were less likely to select the separate accounts or partial-pooling 
option compared with a sharing everything approach. In order to test whether the effect 
of relationship duration was conditional on fictional couples’ marital status (Hypothesis 
2b), I conducted additional analyses that included an interaction of relationship duration 
and marital status (results not shown). Respondents were slightly more likely to select a 
shared-only account for cohabitors together for seven years compared with cohabitors 
together for three years (p <. 05). The relationship duration of married couples showed no 
statistically significant effect. Overall, the expectation that longer relationship durations 
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would be associated with greater support for financial integration was supported for 
cohabitors but not for married couples (Hypothesis 2b). 
To aid interpretation of the coefficients, the predicted proportions of respondents 
selecting each organizational approach, after adjusting for effects of the other model 
variables, are presented in Figure 3.2. Statistical tests notated in Figure 3.2 were adjusted 
for the multiple comparisons using the Bonferroni adjustment, dividing the alpha level 
(.05) by the number of pairwise tests (6). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, the predicted 
probability of selecting only a shared account was greater for married couples, about .49, 
compared with cohabiting couples (.23 without children and .34 for parents). Still, 
consistent with the no-difference null hypothesis for Hypothesis 1, results also showed 
evidence of support for sharing money for both married and cohabiting couples alike. 
Sixty-nine percent of respondents (.23 shared-only + .46 partial-pooling) were predicted 
to select some level of financial integration for cohabitors without children. 
Support for keeping at least some money separate was also evident for all couples. 
About 50 percent of respondents would be predicted to support married parents treating 
at least some income as individually owned (.10 separate-only + .40 for partial-pooling). 
To be sure, greater support for sharing money was indicated for couples who were 
married (Hypothesis 1), had longer relationship durations (Hypothesis 2a), or were 
parents (Hypothesis 3a). Taken together, these findings suggest some ambivalence about 
the resolution to the conflict between values of family unity and economic autonomy 
within family relationships. 
Parental status had an independent effect on beliefs about financial integration for 
cohabiting couples; compared with cohabiting non-parents, 11% more respondents 
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selected a shared account for cohabiting parents (p < .01). There were no statistically 
significant differences between evaluations of married couples by parental status. Thus, 
the influence of parental status on perceptions of financial integration was conditional on 
the marital status of the couple. Despite expectations that the greatest support for 
financial integration would be for married parents (Hypothesis 3b), this was not what the 
findings showed. The results partially supported Hypothesis 3a that support for sharing 
money would be greater for parents than non-parents. To summarize, parental status did 
affect beliefs about financial integration, but the effect was conditional on the marital 
status of the fictional couple. 
Turning to the analysis of the sub-sample of respondents who selected the partial-
pooling option (45% of respondents), Table 3.4 presents the preferred levels of income 
sharing. Respondents preferred a greater amount of sharing when the fictional couples 
were parents and in formally legalized relationships. The negative and statistically 
significant coefficients of the marital and parental status manipulations associated with 
“his account” and “her account” indicate that beliefs about income were responsive to 
common family transitions. As the fictional people become husbands and wives and 
fathers and mothers, the level of preferred income sharing increased. Similar to the 
results described in Table 3.3, these findings presented in Table 3.4 were consistent with 
Hypothesis 1 and 3a.  
Figure 3.3 illustrates the average predicted proportion of earned income to be 
distributed into each account, after adjusting for variation in the other model variables 
(calculated from Table 3.4). For example, the predicted proportion indicated to be kept in 
a shared account for married parents was .63, holding the other variables at their means. 
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In contrast, the supported level of sharing for cohabiting non-parents reported by the 
sample of respondents who selected this partial-pooling arrangement was .53. On 
average, respondents reported men should withhold 22% of their earnings for their 
personal account when cohabiting without children, falling to about 19% of their earnings 
if they were shown as an unwed parent or married without children (p < .05). Beliefs 
about women’s personal finances seemed to be influenced in a similar way. Additional 
statistical tests, not shown, indicated no statistical difference between the proportion of 
total household income deposited into “his” and “her” accounts within marital and 
parental vignette conditions. 
Support for sharing about half of the total household income was indicated even 
for fictional couples without marital or parental ties (cohabiting non-parents). That 
support for sharing money was evident for both married and cohabiting couples is again 
consistent with the no-difference null hypothesis for Hypothesis 1. Although findings 
support hypotheses that investments in a relationship, such as marriage, children or time, 
are associated with support for family unity, (Hypotheses 1, 2a, 3a), the evidence also 
indicates support for relationship integration without these investments. Unlike the 
previous model, in this sub-sample of respondents who selected partial pooling, I find no 
evidence that support for sharing money was greater for couples in long-term 
relationships than couples in short-term relationships (Hypotheses 2a and 2b). Contrary to 
expectations, minimal evidence indicated support for sharing money was greater for 
married parents than for all other marital and parental configurations (Hypothesis 3b). 
Still, results revealed support for keeping at least some money separate across all fictional 
couple characteristics. For the sub-sample of respondents who selected a partial-pooling 
63 
 
option, respondents indicated the couple should keep more than one-third of earnings in 
individual rather than shared accounts.  
Table 3.4 also showed statistically significant differences in earning distributions 
in “his” and “her” individual accounts for each of the relative earnings categories. As 
expected under Hypothesis 4, respondents reported the higher earner, regardless of 
gender, should maintain ownership of a greater amount of the total household income, 
reflecting that person’s earnings advantage in the marketplace. The lower earner was 
therefore disadvantaged in personal autonomy over income. For example, after adjusting 
for the other model variables, women were expected to have 13% of the total household 
earnings in their personal account under men as primary-earner conditions compared with 
33% of the total earnings when women were the primary earners themselves (see also 
Figure 4).  
Results showed no difference in perceptions of the amount of shared income 
between the man primary-earner vignette compared with the equal-earning vignette, but 
significantly less support for sharing all income when women were presented as the 
primary earner. Two reasons were posited that would predict greater support for women’s 
economic autonomy than men’s: 1) notions of men providing for their families may 
suppress support for men’s economic autonomy but not women’s, and 2) one tactic for 
ensuring women’s control of their finances may be to support their economic autonomy. 
Although unraveling these motivations is not possible with this data, the greater support 
for women’s economic autonomy compared with men’s economic autonomy was 
therefore consistent with Hypothesis 5b (and inconsistent with competing Hypothesis 5a). 
When women were depicted as the primary earner, the predicted portion of total earnings 
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indicated for women’s own accounts was proportionally higher (33%) compared with 
when men were presented as the primary earner (28%) (p < .05). Subsequent interaction 
models (not shown) of marital/parental status by relative earnings showed support for 
economic autonomy declined as the couples were presented as married and parents. 
There were no statistically significant differences comparing parental statuses within 
marital categories. Across all marital/parental status configurations, the proportion of 
total household earnings to be retained in the primary earner’s account was higher when 
women were presented as primary earners compared with primary-earning men.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
To summarize, analyses of the partial-pooling strategy resulted in parallel 
conclusions from analyses of the full sample. Respondents supported a more collectivized 
approach to money when vignette couples were depicted with prior relationship 
investments such as shared children or marriage. As an additional robustness check of the 
partial-pooling conclusions, I assigned respondents who selected “share everything” a 
proportion of 100% for the joint account and a proportion of 0% for his/her accounts. 
Similarly, I assigned 0% for the joint account for respondents who selected “separate 
only” and I assigned the proportion equivalent to the fictional earner into his/her 
accounts. With this full model, the relationship duration variable was now statistically 
significantly associated with a greater percentage of total earnings indicated to be shared 
only and the relative earnings was no longer statistically significant. In other words, for 
the full sample, the effect of relationship duration of the vignette couple suppressed the 
effect of any earnings disparity of the fictional couple on the proportion of the household 
income that was thought to be shared. Notably, the relative earnings continued to matter 
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for predicting the percent allocated in “his” and “her” accounts, even though relationship 
duration also mattered in these full models. This full model was consistent with 
Hypothesis 4. 
Discussion 
This article analyzed the first nationally representative sample of U.S. adults’ 
attitudes about income sharing in families. The data was collected using an experimental 
survey design, a particularly useful approach for investigating conflicting values 
(DiMaggio 2014; Mutz 2011; Swidler 1986). It moves beyond previous research by 
testing how specific indicators of relationship investment (marriage, parental status, and 
relationship duration) influenced support for collectivist or autonomous approaches to 
money in families. Identifying the role each of these relationship investments plays in 
shaping perceptions of the treatment of money in families has so far been challenging. 
The study also used exchange and dependency theories to explore whether earnings 
disparities between partners, and the gender of the higher earner, influenced perceptions 
of the allocation of financial resources between partners. 
The first goal was to tease apart some of the ways relationship investments 
influence support for family unity versus economic autonomy. The findings were 
consistent with theoretical expectations that preferences for family unity, as evidenced by 
collectivized approaches to financial arrangements, would be strongest for couples with 
discernable relationship investments. Results showed a greater proportion of survey 
respondents favored married couples fully sharing their income compared with 
preferences for cohabitors. Influences of parental status and relationship duration were 
conditional on the marital status of the fictional couple. For example, after adjusting for 
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other model variables, about one-third of respondents supported cohabiting parents 
sharing all of their earnings, whereas less than a quarter of respondents indicated 
cohabitors without children should share all of their income. These results are consistent 
with the possibility that cohabiting parents’ integration of finances may be more than a 
strategy to counter economic burdens, an empirical question posited by previous scholars 
(Addo 2014). 
Nevertheless, regardless of relationship investment indicators, findings showed 
widespread support for collectivist approaches to money within families. I found that 
about 1 in 4 respondents selected complete financial pooling for couples living together 
without children and about 7 in 10 respondents chose at least some integration of finances 
for these cohabiting non-parents—the relationships theoretically presumed to have the 
least commitment and common investment. In addition to the analyses of the type of 
approach selected, examination of the sub-sample of respondents (45% of the total 
sample) who selected a partial-pooling method revealed the preferred proportion of 
shared earnings was greater than 50% of the total household income. Although the results 
showed significantly different levels of financial integration by marital and parental 
status, the findings did not demonstrate overwhelming evidence that the preferred level of 
integration for couples varied substantially by marital and parental status. This 
endorsement of integration across couple types may reflect recognition of the efficiencies 
of income pooling, even in relationships without legal protection or expectations of 
permanency (Treas 1993).  
Still, about half of the sample evaluated married couples as preferably 
withholding at least some of their earnings from a shared account. These results were 
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consistent with the prediction that a substantial share of people endorse some economic 
autonomy, as evidenced by respondents’ selection of the fictional couple keeping at least 
some money in separate accounts. Regardless of the fictional legal and kinship ties, most 
respondents supported some level of financial autonomy across the relationship types. 
These findings diverge from popular assumptions that only couples at risk of exiting their 
relationship pursue economic autonomy. An underlying commitment to autonomy within 
stable partnerships may be a function of the transition to individualized relationships 
(Lauer and Yodanis 2011; Yodanis and Lauer 2014). Findings underscore the need to 
further consider individualist interests within all types of families.  
I also tested whether higher-earning partners would receive greater support for 
their economic autonomy compared with the lower-earning partners. Exchange and 
dependency theories suggest economic resources increase authority over family finances 
(Baxter and Kane 1995; Blood and Wolfe 1960; Brines 1994). Although variations in the 
relative earnings of the fictional couple was not predictive of support for a collectivized 
or autonomous approach to money, when money was considered an individual resource, 
the supported division of the total household income did vary by the earnings disparity. 
Primary earners were evaluated as having greater entitlement to personal earnings as 
indicated by the proportion of the total household income to be allocated to their personal 
account—money which can presumably be spent autonomously. When earnings for the 
fictional couple were shown to be unequal, respondents who selected a partial-pooling 
approach said more than 25% of the total household income, on average, should be 
deposited into the higher earner’s account compared with less than 15% of the total 
earnings withheld for the lower earner. These results are consistent with prior research 
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showing that perceived ownership of income is a primary consideration in how couples 
distribute financial resources (Burgoyne et al. 2007).  
It is possible that conservative beliefs about appropriate gender behavior may 
suppress support for women’s economic autonomy. Alternatively, continued beliefs in 
men’s primary role as economic contributors to the family, as well as beliefs in women’s 
need to keep money separately to ensure control of it, may suppress support for men’s 
economic autonomy. To examine these competing theories of how the gender of earners 
influenced perceptions of entitlement to individual ownership of money, the gender of the 
fictional primary earner was varied in the vignettes. Support for withholding earnings 
from the common pot was slightly larger in magnitude for primary-earning women (33%) 
than for primary-earning men (28%).  
This finding was consistent with research that questions gender-neutral exchange 
approaches to explain family dynamics within heterosexual relationships (Bittman et al. 
2003; Munsch 2015). This research suggests one reason why women’s increasing labor 
force participation has not been a sufficient condition to bring about equality within 
families is women’s earnings may be viewed differently than men’s earnings. These 
results are consistent with evidence that women’s money is often treated as supplemental 
to families’ financial well-being (Potuchek 1997). Behavioral evidence shows some 
women withhold their earnings to ensure control over them, maybe to direct money 
towards services that replace their unpaid household burdens (Cohen 1998; Gupta 2007). 
These findings add to evidence that power differentials in couples are not fully explained 
by income differentials, and beliefs about gender and appropriate family dynamics are 
important dimensions to further investigate (Moore 2008).  
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This study is not without its limitations. I used a shared account as a proxy for 
collective ownership, but this is an untested assumption. A joint bank account may reflect 
belief in collective operation, but qualitative research finds that is not always the reality 
(Burgoyne et al. 2006). Additionally, although the vignette method uniquely allows for 
the isolation of specific conditions, this study can only explore attitudes about allocation 
of money within families, rather than the behavior itself. This study was also limited to 
analysis of heterosexual couples, as the anticipated variance in gendered dynamics in 
lesbian and gay relationships would have introduced additional factors beyond its scope. 
Artificially inflating the earnings differential between higher-earning women and their 
lower-earning male partners is advantageous to understanding attitudes about money in 
families, although I recognize this situation may be rare in actuality. To limit the 
experiment to a feasible number of vignette conditions, the study did not attempt to 
manipulate the perceived race or ethnicity of the fictional couples, which may have led to 
differences in perceptions of the survey variables. Further variations of these 
characteristics—as well as altering the relationship duration, household income, relative 
earnings, ages, and inclusion of portrayals of stepfamilies—may be an important 
extension of this research. 
Although the consistency between attitudes and behaviors is debated, measuring 
attitudes remains vital to teasing apart mechanisms underlying behavior (Vaisey 2014). 
By eliciting respondents’ opinions of others’ behavior instead of seeking explanatory 
accounts of their own behavior, this study mitigates one concern about the connection 
between attitudes and behavior. The results point to the ways couples may reconcile 
contradictions in their own relationships, even though the negotiations themselves cannot 
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be analyzed using this research design. Research into the intervening factors that 
complicate associations between what people think should happen with money in 
families and how money is actually treated would improve knowledge about family 
dynamics. More research is necessary to determine when dissimilarities in attitudes and 
behavior result from differences in the operationalization of behaviors and attitudes or 
when they stem from other mechanisms. Notably, the attitudes revealed in this study are 
not in contradiction with behavioral research but illuminate the subtlety between the 
dichotomous indicators of pooling or not pooling that is commonly used in behavioral 
studies. 
Paradoxically, even as family configurations are increasingly diverse (Cohen 
2018), the social norms that govern the allocation of money within families appeared 
remarkably similar across family types. The findings from this study indicate that marital 
laws may trail behind cultural norms about resource sharing within families. Cohabiting 
couples were evaluated as preferably integrating resources despite the lack of legal 
guidance concerning their obligations to one another in the event of a break-up. These 
findings challenge conventional wisdom that an agreed-upon benefit of marriage over 
cohabitation is that marriage uniquely increases the sharing of resources within families. 
Instead, this analysis revealed normative support for sharing most of the total household 
earnings for non-married couples, which suggests that gains from income sharing may 
also be pursued in non-marital unions. Although cohabiting couples are not categorized 
as families for some government purposes, such as welfare policies and the official 




These findings were also consistent with behavioral evidence suggesting the 
pursuit of financial autonomy is a relevant issue for welfare reform (Bennett and Sung 
2013). Evidence from this study suggests all couples may draw on beliefs in economic 
autonomy and entitlement to individual earnings when allocating financial resources, 
potentially perpetuating unequal market forces within personal relationships. Policies 
encouraging poor women to marry may rely on faulty assumptions that couples are 
motivated to redistribute unequal labor market earnings in the home, and only within 
married families. Looking at variation in attitudes across contexts and time may refine 
our understanding of the linkages between micro level and macro level dynamics. 
Considering the broader policy conditions and institutional structures that make up the 
context of relationship dynamics is one possible direction for future research examining 





Table 3.1 Hypotheses about Perceptions of Couples’ Income Sharing 
Family Unity versus Economic Autonomy 
H1 Support for sharing money will be greater for married than cohabiting couples 
H2a 
Support for sharing money will be greater for couples in long-term relationships 
than couples in short-term relationships 
H2b 
Long relationship durations will be associated with greater support for sharing 
money for cohabiting couples but will not influence perceptions of married 
couples 
H3a Support for sharing money will be greater for parents than non-parents 
H3b 
Support for sharing money will be greater for married parents than for all other 
marital and parental configurations 
Equality and Gender 
H4 
Support for economic autonomy will be greater for higher earners than lower 
earners 
H5a 
Support for economic autonomy will be lower when women are presented as the 
primary earner than when men are the primary earner 
H5b 
Support for economic autonomy will be greater when women are presented as the 














Married Respondent is married (1= Yes) 0.54  
Cohabiting Respondent is living with a partner (1 = Yes) 0.05  
Never married Respondent reports they have never been 





Respondent reports they are divorced, 
separated, or widowed (1 = Yes) 
0.19 
Parent At least one child lives with the respondent  
(1 = Yes) 
0.26 





Less than high school Respondent’s highest degree received is less 
than a high school diploma (1 = Yes) 
0.08 
 
High school Respondent’s highest degree received is a 
high school diploma (1 = Yes) 
0.60 
 
College Respondent’s highest degree received is at 
least a bachelor’s degree (1 = Yes) 
0.32 
Employed Respondent reports they are working  
(1 = Yes) 
0.57 
Income Respondent’s household income is at least 
$50,000 a year (1 = Yes) 
0.59 
Age Respondent’s age in years (18 to 92) 50.20    
       
(17.35) 






Table 3.3 Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis of Preferred Income-Organizing 
Approaches by Vignette Manipulations and Respondent Characteristics 
    Partial-Pooling   Separate Accounts 
    Coef. SE     Coef. SE   
Vignette Manipulations               
Marital and Parental Status 
(reference is cohabiting w/out children)        
 Cohabiting parents -0.29 (0.11) **  -1.11 (0.14) *** 
 Married w/out children -0.90 (0.11) ***  -1.96 (0.14) *** 
 Married parents -0.96 (0.11) ***  -1.97 (0.14) *** 
Relationship Duration  
(reference is 3 years) -0.12 (0.07)   -0.43 (0.10) *** 
Relative Income 
(reference is man primary earner)        
 Equal earners 0.18 (0.09) *  0.01 (0.12)  
 Woman primary earner 0.07 (0.09)   0.03 (0.12)  
Respondent Characteristics               
Women 0.33 (0.07) ***  0.08 (0.10)  
Relationship Status (reference is 
married)         
Cohabiting 1.12 (0.20) ***  1.30 (0.24) ***  
Never married 0.94 (0.11) ***  0.83 (0.15) ***  
Other relationship status 0.57 (0.10) ***  0.46 (0.15) ** 
Parent 0.00 (0.09)   -0.07 (0.13)  
White -0.47 (0.08) ***  -0.32 (0.11) ** 
Education (reference is high school)         
Less than high school -0.11 (0.15)   0.14 (0.19)   
College 0.28 (0.08) **  -0.04 (0.11)  
Employed 0.19 (0.08) *  0.14 (0.11)  
Income Greater than $50,000 -0.18 (0.08) *  -0.29 (0.11) * 
Age 0.01 (0.00) ***  0.00 (0.00)  
Intercept -0.14 (0.27)   0.84 (0.35) * 
N = 3,986; Note: Baseline is Shared Account; Standard errors are in parentheses; 
List-wise deletion used for missing data; Wald chi2 = 533.13; Bayesian information 






Table 3.4 OLS Regression Analysis of the Effects of Vignette Manipulations and 
Respondent Characteristics on Perceptions of Allocation of Household Income 
 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE


















0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)










0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.00)
*
0.00 (0.01)
Cohabiting -0.02 (0.02) 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Never Married -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Other Relationship 0.02 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)







Less than High School 0.01 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
College 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)



















Shared Account His Account Her Account
Relationship Duration 
(Reference is 3 years)
Marital & Parental Status
(Reference is Cohabiting w/out Children)
Vignette Manipulations
N = 1,784; Note: Analysis includes only respondents who selected "both shared 
and separate accounts"; Standard errors are in parentheses; List wise deletion used 









Education (Reference is High School)









Figure 3.1 Experimental Design 
 
Figure 3.2 Predicted Proportion of Each Organizational Category by Marital/Parental 






Figure 3.3 Predicted Proportion of Preferred Income Distribution by Marital/Parental 
Status for Partial-Poolers 
 
 
Figure 4. Predicted Proportion of Preferences of Income Distribution by Relative 




CHAPTER FOUR: IS FAMILY DECISION-MAKING POWER? 
Abstract 
This paper used relative resource theory to make predictions about support for decision-
making authority and consider two potential moderators: the gender system and methods 
of allocating income. Using original data (n = 3,975) from a vignette-survey experiment, 
findings showed primary earners within families were not regarded as entitled to the final 
word in family decisions. Whether respondents considered earnings individually or 
community owned did not explain the lack of association between financial resources and 
decision-making clout. Instead, results showed a significant association between the 
fictional decider’s gender and fairness evaluations. When women were presented as the 
decider over monetary family choices, unilateral decision-making was viewed more 
favorably. Final say over shared activities was viewed more favorably when fictional men 
were the decider. Findings were consistent with an egalitarian essentialism framework, that 
women and men are equal but characteristically different, suggesting “final say” measures 





Between 1980 and 2000, spouses were increasingly likely to report neither spouse 
had final-decision making authority compared with a previous consensus that husbands 
usually maintained the final word (Amato et al. 2007). By 2008, Pew Research Center 
proclaimed public consensus that women were the decision makers in the home. Drawing 
on classic research by Blood and Wolf (Blood and Wolfe 1960), the assumption in Pew’s 
declaration was that women hold more power than men within families because they are 
more likely to be seen as the final decision makers over home matters. Blood and Wolf’s 
research generated a steady stream of empirical analyses using decision making as the 
primary indicator of power within family relationships, although there are reasons to 
suspect final decision making may not function as a proxy measure for power (Hsiao-Li 
2010). Employment, earnings, and gender ideology have all been identified as key 
sources of power, but how these mechanisms interact to manifest in decision making 
authority is not well established (Blumberg and Coleman 1989). Complicating matters, 
these characteristics are often regarded as proxy measures of power themselves, despite a 
lack of empirical testing. A central critique of “final say” measures is that they fail to 
capture processing power – identifying who leads the conversation, presents the options, 
changes their partner’s mind, and deems decisions as valuable and worthwhile (Galliher 
et al. 1999; Hsiao-Li 2010; Simpson et al. 2015; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). Power may 
be a dominant research topic but definitions of power are varied and measurements of 
power within families are not well validated (Blumberg and Coleman 1989; Farrell, 
Simpson, and Rothman 2015; Mizan 1994). 
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To address some of these shortcomings, this study identifies the sources and 
reasoning processes behind the outcomes of commonly used “final say” survey measures. 
Using a mixed-methods approach, I isolate sources of decision-making authority by using 
original data from a vignette-survey experiment collected from a national sample of U.S. 
adults. Respondents were presented with a fictional couple that varied by their relative 
earnings and the gender of the decider. Respondents reported how they thought the 
fictional couple should share their income and indicated their perception of fairness in 
two hypothetical decisions: 1) a monetary family decision and 2) a decision about a 
shared activity. To attend to the reasoning behind these mechanisms, I also include an 
exploratory critical discourse analysis of respondents’ short answer explanations for their 
fairness perception, revealing the patterns in the logic behind decision-making authority. 
Using an experiment to examine the sources of decision-making authority is 
advantageous for two reasons. First, isolating the effects of multiple power bases within 
the population is difficult given the non-randomization of the co-occurrence of variables 
of interest. For example, it is challenging to separate power stemming from gender norms 
from power derived from higher financial contributions because the two often coincide 
(i.e., male breadwinners). Second, people’s justifications of their own behavior reflects a 
mixture of attitudes, circumstance, context, and other factors (Cherlin 2009), whereas 
opinions of others may better estimate normative values. I begin by using relative 
resource theory to predict beliefs about entitlement to decision making, that as partners 
bring increasing resources home, they gain decision-making authority within their 
families. I then turn to two potential moderators of relative resources’ explanatory power: 




In this paper, I adopt Weber’s definition of power, the ability to enforce one’s will 
even against resistance (Komter 1989). In Blood and Wolfe’s (1960) classic study, 
individuals with incomes larger than their partner’s earnings generally held decision 
making authority, consistent with resource and exchange theories that explain men’s 
family power as a function of their greater monetary contribution to the household 
(Becker 1974; Coltrane 1996; Ferree 1990). For example, primary-earning men often 
have the last word about family financial decisions and more often spend ostensibly 
shared money without consulting their partners (Burgoyne et al. 2006). Given this 
association, having greater entitlement to final say on family decisions was interpreted as 
one expression of power. Increases in women’s waged work were expected to increase 
women’s bargaining power within the family, as they contribute more to the common pot 
(Bittman et al. 2003; Brines 1994). Indeed, women have gained some influence in family 
decision making and increased control of family money as the difference in their relative 
incomes diminished (Belch and Willis 2002; Kenney 2006). Thus, I hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 1: Support for decision-making authority will be greater for higher-
earner than lower-earner partners 
Yet, extant research documents women’s challenges in gaining greater power 
within the family, despite their increased financial contributions (Townsend 2002). For 
example, economic dependence arguments have largely been unable to explain 
persistently unequal household labor division between men and women (Gupta 2007). As 
the relative earnings of couples converge, informal ways of sustaining inequality between 
men and women become apparent (Komter 1989). Below, I detail two potential mediators 
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of women’s ability to translate increased earnings into power within their families: the 
gender system and methods of allocating financial resources. 
Gender System 
The gender system, processes that define men and women as significantly 
different from one another, may account for the lackluster ability of relative resource 
theories to explain persistent gender inequality within families (Ridgeway and Smith-
Lovin 1999). Men may be viewed as the head of the household, ultimately harnessing 
power in families no matter their relative contribution to the family’s income. Although 
an increasing proportion of people report they want an equal partnership, men continue to 
prefer a conventional male breadwinner/female homemaker arrangement if equality is not 
possible (Gerson 2011). Other evidence suggests a return to conventional gender 
ideology, creeping support for men as final decision makers for families, among younger 
generations (Pepin and Cotter 2018). 
Higher-earning wives do not seem to convert their higher-earning status into 
power to the same extent as men (Blood and Wolfe 1960; Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; 
Burgoyne 2004; Burgoyne et al. 2006; Hochschild and Machung 1989) and some couples 
intentionally preserve men’s power within families (Tichenor 1999). In some instances, 
women control household expenditures, but men control the inflow of household money 
and maintain veto power (Hsiao-Li 2010). Primary-earning women sometimes minimize 
their financial dominance intentionally in order to protect the masculinity of their partners 
(Brines 1994; Pyke 1994). Commitment to conventional gender ideology may account for 
men’s tendency to hold power over decisions having little to do with money, such as 
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deciding on shared leisure activities (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983; Schwartz 1994). 
Drawing on this empirical literature, I suggest the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2a: Support for decision-making authority will be greater for men than 
women 
Alternatively, there are reasons to suspect women will be evaluated as holding 
decision-making authority over family matters. In Blood and Wolfe’s (1960) work, they 
found wives were the decision maker over household matters. Consequently, family 
decisions may be seen as fundamentally in women’s domain, no matter her earnings. 
Based on these considerations, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2b: Support for decision-making authority will be greater for women 
than men 
Adherence to egalitarian essentialist ideology, that men and women are equal but 
inherently different, may be associated with perceptions of decision-making (Cotter, 
Hermsen, and Vanneman 2011). Some research shows women and men are seen as 
having different spheres of interest and authority (Amato et al. 2007; Blood and Wolfe 
1960). Whether or not women’s family decision-making is indicative of power is not 
straightforward. Although decision making may be construed as power, responsibility for 
family decisions may reflect an endless second shift for women (Hochschild and 
Machung 1989; Walzer 1998). Moreover, decision-making authority may not indicate 
power if women are expected to make choices that center decisions on the concerns and 
interests of their male partners (Blumberg and Coleman 1989; Komter 1989). One way to 
begin to evaluate the idea of differing spheres is to test whether decision-making 
authority varies by the realm of the decision and the reasons provided for the fairness 
perception. If family decision-making authority is indicative of women’s increased 
power, we should expect to see women’s entitlement to decision making for decisions 
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related to monetary items for the family as well as decisions made purely for purposes of 
personal enjoyment, such as a shared activity. However, if women’s family decision-
making is a marker of a second-shift, we might expect to see support for women’s 
decision-making related to family matters but not for decisions solely about personal 
preferences. Therefore, I present the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Support for women's decision-making will be greater for families’ 
monetary decisions than for activity decisions 
To attend to the question of whether decision-making authority is indicative of 
power, this study also contributes an exploratory analysis of respondents’ reasoning 
behind monetary decisions.  
Financial Allocation Strategies 
Resource theories fail to take into account what happens to individual income 
once it enters households (Kenney 2006; Roman and Vogler 1999). Assumptions that 
increases in women’s relative earnings are translated into greater say over the household 
presume family members combine money into a common pot and then jointly decide how 
it will be spent. However, women’s wages are often assigned different meanings than 
men’s wages, and therefore treated differently than men’s wages, diminishing women’s 
ability (or desire) to translate their earnings into power within their relationships (Pyke 
1994). Indeed, women’s labor force participation is associated with decreases in sharing 
financial resources (Kenney 2006).  
Although women may be closing the gap in absolute earnings, they are not 
necessarily increasing the amount of earnings they deposit into a shared pot, diminishing 
potential advances in entitlement to say over family matters. In anticipation of difficulties 
translating earnings into power once money becomes shared, some women keep their 
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earnings separate as a way to maintain individual control over them (Bennett 2013). For 
example, women not currently in the labor force report they expect to keep future 
earnings separate once they re-enter the labor market (Burgoyne 1990). When couples 
keep some or all money separate, we might not see any differences in women’s decision-
making authority based on their relative earnings to their partner. Some evidence 
suggests keeping money separately is associated with male dominance (Vogler and Pahl 
1994). Consequently, support for women’s decision-making authority may be weakened 
when income is thought to be an individual resource. Therefore, the final hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 4: Support for high-earning women's decision-making authority will 
be conditional on support for pooled finances 
To review, in this paper I evaluate how relative-resources, the gender system, and 
financial allocation strategies influence perceptions of decision-making authority. I 
provide a summary of the four hypothesis stemming from relative resource and exchange 
theory and the empirical literature in Table 4.1. To test these hypotheses, I designed a 
vignette-survey experiment to collect data on a nationally representative sample of U.S. 
adults’ beliefs about decision-making in families. I use a mixed-methods approach to 
disentangle when decision-making authority takes the form of mental labor and when it 
represents power, evaluating both quantitative differences in fairness perceptions and 
respondents’ short-answer reasoning of their fairness evaluation.  
Data and Methods 
I draw on original data from a nationally representative dataset supported by 
Time-sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences (Freese and Druckman 2016). 
Respondents were recruited by GfK, which fielded the survey in July and August of 
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2016. A total of 4,020 respondents participated in the survey, and had a response rate of 
60.3 percent. The analytic sample was meant to closely parallel the demographics of the 
United States. I used sample weights in all analyses to correct for any misrepresentation 
of the US population but the results were consistent with or without the weights. Three 
respondents selected contradictory responses across two survey questions and were 
subsequently excluded from the analysis.3 I used list-wise deletion in the analyses, 
resulting in 42 additional deleted observations for a total sample size of 3,975 
respondents. I present the weighted descriptive statistics for key demographic variables of 
the sample in Table 4.2. 
Experimental Design 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of twenty-four vignettes. The 
vignette design used a two-by-two-by-three-by-two factorial design, resulting in roughly 
equal number of respondents viewing each of 24 different vignettes (summarized in 
Figure 4.1). Vignettes were systematically varied by key characteristics that influence 
relationships: relative earnings, marital status, parental status, and relationship duration. 4  
In each condition, respondents were told that they would be presented with a 
hypothetical scenario and would be asked to give their opinion of how a couple should 
handle money. The 3-year married parents, male higher-earner vignette read, for example 
(italics show manipulated conditions): 
                                                 
3 Three respondents selected a partial-pooling approach for the fictional couple but in a follow-up question 
divided the earnings into an all individual or an all shared approach. Because these respondents’ intentions 
cannot be discerned from their contradictory answers, they were dropped from the analysis. 
4 The marital status, parental status, and relationship duration of the fictional couples were manipulated for 
a different study. These manipulation makes no difference in the conclusions drawn from the analyses in 
this study whether or not they were included in the models. 
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Michelle and Anthony, both 31 years old, are married and have been a couple for 
3 years. They enjoy spending time together and they are happy with their 
relationship. They have one child together. Although they both work about forty 
hours per week, Anthony earns $2,800 a month while Michelle earns $1,200 a 
month. 
 
To test resource and exchange theory, I manipulated the relative income of the 
fictional couple, the gap between men’s share and women’s share of the family’s earned 
income. Dollar amounts of earnings were based on analysis of median total household 
income ($53,657) calculated from the 2014 American Community Survey (DeNavas-
Walt and Proctor 2015). This estimate was rounded down to make comparisons of 
earnings more interpretable for respondents and to represent the lower earner as making 
just over federal minimum wage. By varying whether the higher earner was a man or 
woman, I tested whether resource and exchange theory’s prediction power was 
conditional on gender beliefs.  
As shown in the vignette example, other characteristics of the fictional couple 
were indicated in the vignette in order to address potentially confounding variables. To 
hold constant time in paid labor, each person in the couple was shown as working forty 
hours per week. The fictional couples were presented as 31 years of age which is a little 
older than the average age of first marriage and the age is consistent with timing of first 
births (Cohen 2018). This age was selected because it minimized potentially unintended 
assumptions related to later life stages such as retirement and children from previous 
relationships. Racially neutral names, Anthony and Michelle, were chosen because they 
were the most popular shared names for Black and White babies born about thirty years 
ago (Lieberson 2000).5 
                                                 
5 Pilot tests of the vignette showed respondents assumed the couple’s racial identity was either white or the 
same as their own race. 
88 
 
I began the experiment by asking respondents to indicate how they thought the 
fictional couple they were presented with should allocate their income. Specifically, 
respondents were asked, “Do you think Michelle and Anthony should: (a) Have a shared 
account in which they both deposit all their earned income; (b) Keep all their earned 
income in separate, individual accounts; or (c) Have both a shared account and separate, 
individual accounts? This measure was adapted from behavioral measures used in 
surveys such as the International Social Survey Program, Fragile Families and Child 
Wellbeing Study, and the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health to evaluate 
how couples organize their finances (Brooks-Gunn et al. 2011; Harris et al. 2009; ISSP 
Research Group 2014). The answers to this question were subsequently used as the 
financial allocation predictor variable. 
Next, respondents were asked to evaluate the fairness of the hypothetical decision 
making of couples in fictional vignettes. Respondents were informed the couple has to 
make a decision about purchasing one of three different items: 1) which house or 
apartment to take; 2) what mattress to buy; or 3) where to go on vacation. These items 
were selected because they were items that, in theory, each person in a couple might care 
equally about. To test influences of gender, the survey systematically varied who was 
shown as ultimately making the decision (Michelle or Anthony). Specifically, 
respondents were shown the following prompt: 
Anthony and Michelle have to make a decision about [ITEM]. Although they 
talked this over and they care equally about the decision, [PERSON] ultimately 
decides since they can’t agree. How fair do you think it is that [PERSON] made 
the final decision? 
Respondents were then asked how fair respondents thought it was that person 
made the decision. Perceptions of fairness were measured on a four-point scale: 1. Very 
89 
 
fair; 2. Somewhat fair; 3. Somewhat unfair; and 4. Very unfair. Although pilot testing of 
the survey showed most respondents wanted a choice to indicate the couple must make 
the decision together, the survey was purposefully designed so that “equal input” was not 
an option in order to better measure sources of influence. To facilitate the presentation of 
results and to ease comparison, the scale is presented as a binary measure.6 Answers were 
re-coded to combine “very fair” and “somewhat fair” (1) and “somewhat unfair” and 
“very unfair (0) 7.”   
Next, to test differences in perceptions of monetary decisions and shared activity 
decisions, respondents were subsequently asked their opinion about the fairness of 
deciding about a shared activity, either shared weekend activities or what movie to go 
see8. The gender of the decider was similarly rotated and the same fairness scale was used 
as described before. The activity prompt read:  
Most of the time Anthony and Michelle make a decision together about 
[ACTIVITY]. In instances when they can’t agree, most of the time [PERSON 1] 
eventually accepts [PERSON 2’S] opinion. How fair do you think this is? 
A predictor variable was constructed to test whether the gender of the decider in 
combination with the order of the decision jointly influenced perceptions of fairness. If 
the respondent was assigned a vignette showing the same person (Michelle or Anthony) 
                                                 
6 Some studies have highlighted problems with interpreting interaction effects using logistic regression. 
Models using OLS regression did not change the conclusions of this article.  
7 Analysis not shown indicated that not collapsing the scale produces similar results and does not change 
the main conclusions of this paper. The dichotomous presentation of the results provides for easier 
interpretation and thus was chosen to display the findings. 
8 Items and activities were manipulated to ensure responses were not dependent on the item or activity 
under consideration. In analysis not shown, within item (mattress, house, or vacation) and activity 
(mattress, house, or vacation) groups, there was no variation in perceptions of fairness based on the item or 




ultimately making both the item and a shared activity decision, they were coded as 
receiving the “same” (1) vignette condition. For respondents who received a vignette in 
which the man or woman made the item decision and then the opposite person was 
presented as making the decision about a shared activity, they were coded as receiving 
the “different” (0) vignette condition. 
To summarize, the two primary dependent variables were dichotomous measures 
of the perception of fairness when one person in a fictional couple ultimately made a 
decision about an item and a shared activity. To measure the influence of relative 
earnings, respondents were randomly assigned a vignette in which the fictional man was 
the higher earner, the couple made relatively the same amount of income, or the fictional 
woman was the higher earner. The gender of the decider in the fictional couple (Michelle 
or Anthony) was manipulated to test influences of gender beliefs. To understand how 
perceptions of shared or independent ownership of earnings moderate the effects of 
relative earnings, respondents were asked to indicate if the hypothetical couple should 
share all, none, or some of their income. I also included a binary measure to test whether 
the pattern of decision-making and gender of the decision maker interacted to influence 
perceptions of fairness. 
To further explore the reasoning behind these mechanisms, in an open-ended 
question, I asked respondents to explain why they indicated the level of fairness they 
selected. To analyze this data, I conducted an exploratory critical discourse analysis 
(Fairclough 1995), beginning with an emergent coding strategy and using a constant 
comparative approach to organize recurring reasoning (Corbin and Strauss 2008). 
Initially, I reviewed a random sub-sample of 100 responses and inductively organized 
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them into mutually exclusive categories. I then systematized my procedures by 
generating coding rules and definitions to follow for the remainder of the analysis, 
creating new categories as patterns developed (see Appendix D). In instances where 
respondents used multiple logics to explain their standpoint, I systematically assigned the 
response to the first explanation the respondent provided. About ten percent (n = 400) of 
the short-answer responses related to the item decision were coded, a point at which the 
distribution of responses no longer changed and no new codes were identified. 
Results 
Table 4.3 presents the average perception of fairness for the primary variables of 
interest and the vignette manipulations. The first three rows of the table shows no 
substantial difference in perceptions of fairness by the relative earnings of the fictional 
couple. Moving down the table, about 62 percent of respondents who were told the 
fictional woman made the item and shared activity decisions indicated the decision was 
fair. In contrast, the next row of the table showed only 46 percent of respondents 
indicated the item decision was fair when shown the fictional man made the decision but 
that 71 percent of respondents thought the activity decision was fair when the man was 
shown as the decision maker. There was no substantial difference in perceptions of 
fairness by the financial organizational strategy respondents chose for the fictional 
couple. Across vignette manipulations, respondents were more likely to perceive the 
decision as fair when responding to the activity decision compared with the item 
decision. 
Next, to test for the statistical significance of the descriptive associations, I 
present the results from the logistic regression analyses in Table 4.4. Models include the 
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demographic characteristics of respondents shown in Table 4.2 and the vignette 
manipulations not central to these analyses (not shown). The first three models show the 
perceptions of fairness when the decision being decided was an item and the remaining 
four models (Models 4 – 7) present the results of perceptions of fairness in the follow-up 
decision about a shared activity. The model outcomes are shown as odds ratios, meaning 
that numbers greater than one indicate higher levels of fairness in the decision compared 
to the reference group and numbers less than one represent lower odds of agreement that 
the decision was fair.  
Overall, results from the logistic regression analyses shown in Table 4.4 reflect 
the descriptive evidence reviewed in Table 4.3. Models 1 and 4 show no association 
between the fictional couples’ relative earnings and respondents’ perception of fairness in 
decision-making. Thus, the findings failed to support Hypothesis 1, which predicted that 
support for decision-making authority would be greater for higher-earning partners 
compared with lower-earning partners. Across the models, the gender of the fictional 
decider was associated with perceptions of decision-making. The models all showed a 
coefficient less than one for gender, meaning when the man was presented as making the 
decision about an item, respondents were statistically less likely to evaluate the decision 
as fair compared to respondents who were shown the scenario in which the woman made 
the item decision. These findings were inconsistent with Hypothesis 2a and consistent 
with competing Hypothesis 2b, that support for decision-making authority was greater for 
women than men. In contrast, the follow-up question about deciding on a shared activity 
showed respondents were more likely to evaluate the decision as fair when the decider 
was shown as a man, consistent with Hypothesis 2a but inconsistent with Hypothesis 2b. 
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Combined, these findings show mixed evidence for Hypothesis 2a and 2b. Models 2 and 
5 also showed no statistically significant difference with an interaction between the 
gender of the decider with the relative earnings for the item and activity decisions. These 
findings further suggest perceptions of fairness in decision-making did not vary 
systematically by the relative earnings of couples (inconsistent with Hypothesis 1). 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, support for women's decision-making was greater for 
families' monetary decisions than for activity decisions.  
I added the allocation strategy selected for the fictional couple to test whether the 
lack of association between fairness perceptions and relative earnings could be explained 
by the organizational strategy (Models 3 and 6). I find minimal support for the hypothesis 
that financial organizational strategies were associated with perceptions of decision-
making (Hypothesis 4). When respondents were presented with an equal-earning fictional 
couple and selected both shared and separate accounts compared to only shared accounts, 
item decisions were less likely to be seen as fair. There were no other statistically 
significant differences associated with perceptions of fairness over decisions related to 
the organizational strategy selected for the couple.  
To better illustrate the significant influence of fictional decider’s gender 
compared with relative earnings and financial allocative systems, Figure 4.2 and 4.3 
presents the predicted probability of viewing the decision as fair for the item (Figure 4.2) 
and activity (Figure 4.3) decisions. Probabilities were based on Model 3 (item) and 
Model 6 (activity) of Table 4.4. About two-thirds of respondents evaluated item decisions 
as fair when shown a woman as the fictional decider, compared with fewer than half of 
respondents who were shown a fictional male decider. Together, the results suggest the 
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relative earnings of the fictional couple did not substantially influence the probability that 
respondents viewed the decision as fair. Interestingly, the gender of the fictional decider 
did seem to matter to perceptions of decision-making fairness, although in opposite 
directions depending on the decision. 
Notably, perceptions of activity decisions were more likely to be perceived as fair 
than family item decisions. Model 7 suggested that the pattern of decision-making 
mattered to perceptions of fairness. Counter intuitively, when the gender of the decider 
was the same for both the item and activity decisions, respondents were more likely to 
perceive the decision as fair, compared to when the decider was rotated. This pattern was 
true regardless of whether the decider was presented as a woman or a man in both cases. 
However, when the second decision was shown as decided by a man, respondents were 
more likely to agree the decision was fair whether the woman or the man made the first 
decision. Although fewer than half of respondents reported it was fair for the fictional 
man to decide about the item, about 70 percent of respondents reported it was fair when 
he decided about the activity. Evaluations of women’s decisions were less dependent on 
the type of decision being made, with about 60 percent of respondents reporting it was 
fair for women to decide either decision. The results point to intriguing reasoning behind 
the gendered nature of decisions. What these quantitative findings cannot tell us is 
whether perceptions of fairness about decision making were a measure of acceptance of 
women’s legitimacy as power-holders in families. Answering that question requires 




The exploratory critical discourse analysis of the short-answer responses 
respondents gave describing their reasoning for their fairness perspective produced six 
master categories: equality or bust; decision has to be made; gender trumps all; money 
talks; item dependent; and giving in is a decision. The remaining respondents did not 
follow logic that was easily categorized into a similar group, their answer was unclear, or 
the respondent did not provide an answer. The distribution of these categories is 
presented in Figure 4.4. The most frequently provided reasoning suggested respondents 
evaluated the fairness of the decision on whether it was made jointly and equally 
(equality or bust). In 94% of these answers, the respondent rated the decision as unfair. In 
the other 6% of cases, the respondents referenced their decision to rate the decision as 
“somewhat fair” as opposed to “very fair.” Many of these respondents argued that no 
decision should be made until the couple reached consensus and compromising was 
suggested repeatedly. 
In a seemingly opposite perspective, the second most frequently cited explanation 
was that a “decision had to be made.” More than 96% of respondents who used this 
reasoning evaluated the decision as fair. Respondents using this logic assumed that 
without someone making a decision, the couple would miss out on the purchase.  
A greater proportion of people argued that gender of the decider (gender trumps 
all) was important, compared with the proportion of people who stated money was a 
deciding factor. The gender of the fictional decider was associated with two competing 
arguments: (1) head of household and (2) happy wife. Respondents arguing head of 
household logic either said the decision was fair when the fictional man made the 
decision or unfair if the fictional woman made the final decision. These respondents were 
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most likely to reference the bible in their statements. In contrast, respondents cited 
women as ultimately being entitled to the final decision for a diversity of reasons. Some 
of these respondents argued that home decisions are a woman’s domain. Others 
suggested that women are more likely to have to conduct the unpaid labor surrounding 
the purchase (planning the vacation or cleaning the household) and thus are entitled to 
greater say. Others said the decision was fair when women make the decision by stating 
“happy wife, happy life,” a wink-and-nod phrase about women’s power in relationships. 
Still others suggested the decision was something that women care more deeply about 
than men, despite the vignette prompt that both members of the couple cared equally 
about the decision they faced. Interestingly, these polarized arguments about men and 
women’s entitlement to final decision making were used about equally. 
Less frequently offered than appeals to gender, some respondents argued that 
greater earnings entitled someone to final say over the item decision. It could be that 
inclusion of the equal earnings vignette muted this reasoning compared to gender 
appeals, but even when excluding the equal earners vignette, respondents cited the gender 
of the fictional earner more frequently than the relative incomes of the fictional couple 
when evaluating the fairness of the decision.  
Although equality or bust was the most popular reasoning provided no matter the 
gender of the fictional decider, it was offered to a greater extent when the man was 
presented as the decider than when the woman was the portrayed decider (Figure 4.5). 
Some respondents insisted they would have said it was fair because a “decision had to be 
made” even if the other person similarly unilaterally decided. Yet, “decision had to be 
made” reasoning was more frequent when the woman was presented as the decider. 
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Gender trumps all reasoning was provided more frequently when the woman was the 
fictional decider. With little difference by the gender of the fictional decider, respondents 
drew on the relative earnings of the couple to justify their decision or used logic that 
pulled directly on the item in question being presented or argued that giving in by the 
fictional person was itself a decision. 
Respondents reasoning also hinted that decision making in families was not 
necessarily experienced as a form of power for women. Some respondents suggested the 
family decision was a chore, saying “she probably researched the item” or rated the 
decision as unfair because “They should have a partnership and he should contribute.” 
Others indicated monetary family decisions were additional responsibility, such as 
describing the decider as the person who “stepped-up,” not “passing the buck,” or “taking 
initiative.” There were interesting instances of men visualizing the decision as one they 
might face with their partner and they often revealed instances of hidden veto power, 
with these respondents writing about “letting her” make the decision. One man wrote, “I 
would let my wife pick if that was our situation. It's always good when you're married to 
have the fallback position. I told you so.” In other instances, respondents presumed the 
decider was considering the needs of their partner or the family as a whole. For instance, 
one person wrote “…Maybe Michelle is taking the child into consideration.” 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The contribution of this article was exploring the influence of relative earnings, 
the gender system, and the allocation of financial resources on perceptions of decision 
making within families. A substantial stream of research on inequality within families 
uses “final say” survey questions to analyze power in relationships, even though using 
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decision-making authority as a proxy for power is questionable (Galliher et al. 1999; 
Hsiao-Li 2010; Simpson et al. 2015; Thibaut and Kelley 1959). In this paper, I 
investigated the sources and reasoning processes behind these “final say” survey 
indicators to better understand when and if decision-making authority indicates power in 
relationships. If “final say” characterizes power, relative resource and exchange theory 
suggests that individuals with incomes larger than their partner’s earnings will be 
evaluated as entitled to greater decision-making authority (Becker 1974).  
Findings showed no significant difference in perceptions of fairness based on the 
relative earnings of the fictional couple. In fact, respondents were primed to think about 
money because they were asked to evaluate how a fictional couple should share financial 
earnings before responding to questions about decision-making. Despite this, relative 
earnings of the fictional couple were not statistically significant in any of the models and 
the qualitative analysis shows money was not a predominate justification used when 
describing evaluations of fairness. The empirical analysis also showed that conceptions of 
money as individual or shared had little influence on perceptions of fairness in decision-
making. In other words, how money is allocated within households did not appear to 
explain the lack of explanatory power of couples’ relative earnings on perceptions of 
decision-making authority. These results suggest that if “final say” authority represents 
power, the power source is not derived through economic contributions to the household. 
I also reviewed arguments that gender may be a primary source of decision-
making authority. In doing so, I presented two competing perspectives about how gender 
norms may influence the perception of fairness in decision-making. On the one hand, 
men may wield decision-making authority if they were considered the “head of 
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households.” On the other hand, beliefs in egalitarian essentialism, that women and men 
are inherently different but equal, may result in normative support for women’s 
entitlement to decisions about family and home matters. Findings revealed that the 
gender of the fictional decider mattered substantially to people’s perceptions of fairness. 
Decisions about items were more likely to be viewed as fair when women were presented 
as the decider. In contrast, support for women’s decision-making authority was not as 
evident in follow-up decisions about activities, when decisions made by men were 
evaluated more positively. Overall, these findings are consistent with research showing 
commitment to beliefs in egalitarian essentialism, that women and men are equal but 
characteristically different (Cotter et al. 2011).   
These findings demonstrate that family dynamics in couples are not fully 
explained by income differentials, whereas gender identity was an important dimension 
to perceptions of fairness. Results add to evidence that decisions affecting families are 
predominately believed to be women’s responsibility. More people questioned the 
fairness of item decisions when the man was presented as the decider, whereas women’s 
item decisions were more likely to go unchallenged, reporting a decision just ‘Had to be 
Made.’ What this data can’t resolve is whether men were viewed as having an interest in 
these decisions but were not entitled to it, or whether the decisions affecting families are 
trivialized in ways similar to the devaluation of predominately female occupations 
(Hsiao-Li 2010). If men aren’t interested in family decisions, is women’s decision 
making authority really indicative of power (Komter 1989)? 
The underlying reasoning that lead respondents to evaluate women’s decision as 
fair suggest considering decision-making a source of power is questionable. Whether 
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respondents were attuned to the difference in the type of decision or the pattern of 
decision-making is unclear. Are perceptions of decision-making influenced by other 
relationship dynamics? The quantitative findings suggested respondents were not using 
trade-offs as a benchmark for their evaluation given that when one person was shown as 
making both decisions respondents rated it as more fair. A more persistent limitation of 
this study is that it cannot evaluate processing power, the ability of partners to lead 
conversation and control what and how decisions are discussed. For example, pleas for 
joint decision making don’t describe who is likely to ultimately compromise or whether 
both partners are expected to contribute equally to arrive at a decision (Hsiao-Li 2010). It 
may be beneficial to expand theoretical perspectives of decision-making. Like 
housework, emotional and relationship capital may be important dimensions to consider 
(Geist and Ruppanner 2018).  
Future research may consider perceptions of fairness regarding personal spending 
money. It would be interesting to evaluate how gender influences who is seen as entitled 
to make unilateral decisions about spending for personal items. The next step in this 
analysis was to explore the reasoning behind the perception of fairness in the follow-up 
questions about shared activities. Although women may appear to have increased power 
as evidenced by their management of family budgets, their control over surplus income 
may be a better indicator of power than the allocation of resources for basic necessities 
(Blumberg and Coleman 1989). 
I began this paper asking whether “final say” survey questions measure power 
within families. Findings show no definitive support that decision-making is a proxy for 
power. Although some may argue that results suggest normative support for women’s 
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power over family matters, the processes behind the social consensus in women’s 
decision-making authority may reflect a necessity brought about by the unequal social 
conditions in which family relationships operate (Gramsci 1971). Beliefs in the gender 
system were intransigent, as resource-advantaged women were no more or less likely to 
be seen as ultimately responsible for family decisions. Final say over family matters may 
lead some women to feel powerful, whereas for others it may bring an endless second 
shift (Hochschild and Machung 1989). As men and women’s time allocations converge, 
measures of gender inequality within families beyond differences in unpaid labor become 
imperative (Bianchi et al. 2012). Even when both men and women work outside the 
home, women may be called upon to participate in family decisions more than men. 
Women may be responsible for decisions whether they share the decision responsibility 
with their male partners (equality or bust) or if they are expected to make them on their 
own (“decision had to be made”). Increases in men’s willingness to participate in unpaid 
family labor, specifically childcare, does not seem to translate into increased 
responsibility for family decisions (Knudsen and Wærness 2009). It may be that family 
decision-making operates more like housework than childcare, a necessary part of family 
life but one that is less enjoyable than actively caring for children (Bianchi et al. 2012). In 





Table 4.1 Hypotheses about Perceptions of Decision-making 
Relative Earnings and Exchange Theory 
H1 
Support for decision-making authority will be greater for higher-earner than 
lower-earner partners 
Gender System 
H2a Support for decision-making authority will be greater for men than women 
H2b Support for decision-making authority will be greater for women than men 
H3 
Support for women's decision-making will be greater for families' monetary 
decisions than for activity decisions 
Financial Allocation Strategies 
H4 
Support for high-earning women's decision-making authority will be conditional 














Married Respondent is married (1= Yes)           0.53   
Cohabiting Respondent is living with a partner (1 = Yes)           0.05   
Never married Respondent reports they have never been 
married (1 = Yes)           0.25   
Other relationship status Respondent reports they are divorced, 
separated, or widowed (1 = Yes)           0.16  
Parent At least one child lives with the respondent  
(1 = Yes)           0.29  





Less than high school Respondent’s highest degree received is less 
than a high school diploma (1 = Yes)           0.12   
High school Respondent’s highest degree received is a 
high school diploma (1 = Yes)           0.58   
College Respondent’s highest degree received is at 
least a bachelor’s degree (1 = Yes)           0.30  
Employed Respondent reports they are working  
(1 = Yes)           0.59  
Income Respondent’s household income is at least 
$50,000 a year (1 = Yes)           0.62  
Age Respondent’s age in years (18 to 92)         47.18     
      (17.38) 






Table 4.3. Weighted Bivariate Statistics of Perceptions of Fairness in Decision Making 
by Type of Decision (N = 3,975) 
    Item Activity 
Primary Variables of Interest M SD M SD 
Relative Earnings     
 Man Higher-earner 0.55 0.50 0.67 0.47 
 Woman Higher-earner 0.53 0.50 0.69 0.46 
 Equal Earners 0.54 0.50 0.65 0.48 
Gender of Decider     
 Woman 0.62 0.49 0.63 0.48 
 Man 0.46 0.50 0.71 0.45 
Financial Allocation Strategy     
 Shared 0.52 0.50 0.68 0.47 
 Separate 0.52 0.50 0.67 0.47 
 Both 0.56 0.50 0.66 0.47 
Secondary Vignette Manipulations         
Marital Status     
 Cohabiting 0.56 0.50 0.66 0.47 
 Married 0.52 0.50 0.68 0.47 
Parental Status     
 Non-parent 0.53 0.50 0.66 0.47 
 Parent 0.55 0.50 0.68 0.47 
Relationship Duration     
 3 years 0.55 0.50 0.67 0.47 
 7 years 0.53 0.50 0.67 0.47 
Note: Descriptive statistics include survey weights.  





Table 4.4 Weighted Logistic Regression Models of the Effect of Gender, Relative Income and Financial Allocation Strategy on 
Perceptions of Fairness in Decision Making (N = 3,975) (Odds Ratios)  
    Item Activity 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Relative Income (reference is man higher-earner)    
          
 Woman Higher-earner 0.92  1.05  1.08 
  1.07  1.18  1.08  1.09  
 Equal Earners 0.93  1.06  1.20 
  0.93  1.03  1.07  1.06  
Man Decider (reference is woman) --  0.62 
*** 0.52 *** --  1.71 
*** 1.44 *** 1.44 *** 
Gender * Relative Income      
          
 Man X Woman Higher-earner --  0.76  -- 
  --  0.79  --  --  
 Man X Equal Earners --  0.79  -- 
  --  0.77  --  --  
Financial Allocation Strategy (reference is both)    
          
 Separate --  --  1.19 
  --  --  1.03  1.03  
 Both --  --  1.50 
** --  --  1.13  1.15  
Financial Strategy * Relative Income     
          
 Equal Earners X Separate --  --  0.69 
  --  --  1.06  1.04  
 Equal Earners X Both --  --  0.64 
* --  --  0.70  0.69  
 Woman Higher-earner X Separate --  --  0.73 
  --  --  1.01  0.98  
 Woman Higher-earner X Both --  --  0.75 
  --  --  0.95  0.91  
Same Gender Decision Maker --  --  -- 
  --  --  --   1.58  
*** 
Intercept 
   
2.93  *** 
   
2.82  *** 
   
2.69  ** 
   
2.62  ** 
   
2.49  ** 
   
2.47  ** 
   
2.04  * 
Note: List-wise deletion used for missing data; Models include controls for respondent characteristics and remaining vignette 




Figure 4.1. Experimental Design 
 
Figure 4.2. Predicted Proportion of Perceived Fairness in Item Decision Making by 






Figure 4.3. Predicted Proportion of Perceived Fairness in Activity Decision Making by 














CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
The goal of this dissertation was to explore mechanisms associated with different 
types of money arrangements in families (aim 1) and to evaluate the association between 
financial arrangements and gender inequality in families (aim 2). To meet these aims, I 
conducted three empirical studies using data from the 2012 International Social Survey 
Program and original data from a nationally representative vignette-survey experiment. In 
this concluding chapter, I summarize the empirical results, discuss the contributions of 
the findings, review the limitations of the methods in this dissertation, and finish by 
considering avenues for continued research. 
Summary of Empirical Results 
The theoretical puzzle of continued gender inequality within families despite 
women’s gains in the marketplace has led to the need for a more comprehensive theory of 
the household economy. Economic dependence arguments explaining gender inequality 
rely on assumptions that couples pool their earnings and that money facilitates power in 
family relationships. This dissertation empirically evaluated these two assumptions, 
considering the conditions associated with pooling income and the sources of family 
decision-making authority, a common measurement of power in families. 
In Chapter 2, I examined macro and micro-level influences on couples’ 
approaches to organizing household income in 20 countries using data from the 2012 
International Social Survey Programme. Previous literature showed the macro-level 
gendered context was associated with how couples organized their income but the 
empirical results have been contradictory. Some evidence suggested that as women’s 
earning power increased, couples were more likely to keep their money separately, 
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potentially increasing women’s control over financial resources (Hamplová and Le 
Bourdais 2009; Treas and Widmer 2000). In contrast, other evidence suggested couples 
prioritizing women and men’s equal access to money were more likely to share financial 
resources (Nyman 1999; Roman and Vogler 1999).  
I considered the possibility that joint influences of gender dynamics and family 
structures could contribute to resolving these conflicting results. Findings showed 
married couples continued to pool their money in more gender equal countries, but were 
more likely to report joint management of shared earnings, instead of one money 
manager as reported in gender unequal contexts. Cohabitors were more likely to keep 
some or all of their money separate in gender equal contexts, compared with having one 
money manager in contexts with more gender inequality. By demonstrating that married 
and cohabiting couples’ approaches to organizing money responded differently to macro-
level gender inequality, these findings help resolve the different conclusions about the 
ways country level forces matter to intrahousehold dynamics. In more gender equal 
contexts, married couples may prioritize equal access to family finances, whereas 
cohabiting couples may prioritize fairness related to control of earnings. 
Chapter 3 focused on one context, the United States, and one micro-level 
mechanism, beliefs about income sharing in families. Having just argued the importance 
of the cultural context in the treatment of money in families, I turned my attention to U.S. 
adults’ attitudes about income sharing in families. This research drew on an original 
vignette-survey experiment to test how specific indicators of relationship investment 
(marriage, parental status, and relationship duration) influenced support for collectivist 
(shared accounts) or autonomous (separate accounts) approaches to money in families. 
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Results showed support for shared-only accounts corresponded with signals of 
relationship investment. Still, most respondents supported some level of autonomy for all 
relationship configurations. Perhaps surprisingly, findings revealed widespread support 
for a hybrid approach to sharing money – pooling some money and keeping some money 
separate. Higher-earning women configurations were also associated with greater support 
for separate money arrangements than men as higher-earners. These findings add to 
evidence that calls into question gender-neutral exchange approaches to explaining 
family dynamics.  
The primary focus of Chapter 4 was evaluating the influence of relative earnings, 
the gender system, and the allocation of financial resources on perceptions of decision-
making within families, a commonly used indicator of power. The study aimed to isolate 
sources of support for decision-making authority and the reasoning processes behind 
these associations, using data from a vignette-survey experiment collected from a 
national sample of U.S. adults. I found no association between relative-earnings or 
methods of allocating income and support for family decision-making. Rather, findings 
showed the gender of the decider had the greatest influence on survey respondents’ 
perceptions of decision-making. Thus, support for decision-making did not operate in 
ways expected by economic theory of resource exchange. Additionally, the underlying 
reasoning that lead respondents to evaluate women’s decision-making authority as fair 
cast doubt on assumptions that decisions were a source of power. The data suggested 




Drawing conclusions about separate financial arrangements in families has been 
challenging, due in part to the complexity of multiple cultural forces influencing family 
dynamics. Moreover, because families are increasingly diverse, norms about how couples 
are expected to share money are weakening and are negotiated at the couple level 
(Burgoyne 2008; Cherlin 2004; Kenney 2006). This dissertation offers some theoretical 
guidance regarding the cultural mechanisms associated with different types of money 
arrangements in families and the association between financial arrangements and gender 
inequality in families.  
First, this research attended to some of the ways couples are embedded within 
cultural contexts, and how these contexts influence the treatment of money in families 
(Swidler 1986). A stream of research previously documented minimal differences in the 
gap between married and cohabiting couples’ level of integration of financial resources, 
despite national differences in the institutionalization of cohabitation (Hamplová and Le 
Bourdais 2009; Hamplová et al. 2014; Heimdal and Houseknecht 2003). These findings 
have been surprising because of the expectation that structural variations in the 
institutionalization of cohabitation is presumed to shape family relationships (Turner 
1997). It is clear from the findings from Chapter Two that cohabiting couples’ financial 
arrangements differed more from married couples in contexts with less gender inequality 
than in contexts with greater gender inequality. Using the Gender Inequality Index had 
the advantage of measuring national contexts in a way that measures the effects of both 
cultural and structural mechanisms related to gender inequality. The disadvantage is that 
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teasing apart the mechanism, or constellation of factors, that influence cohabitors’ 
treatment of money remains muddled. 
Sharing finances when cohabiting may be especially risky without 
institutionalized laws and protections, especially for women. The institutions and policies 
in more gender equal countries may be countries most likely to design laws that protect 
women’s disproportionate economic hardships, no matter their family situation. For 
example, Sweden and Norway, both countries with low levels of gender inequality, have 
introduced tax policies and social security systems that explicitly establish the rights and 
obligations of cohabitants (Barlow 2008; Lyngstad et al. 2011). Gender unequal-countries 
tend to be more marriage-centered (Barlow 2008). Therefore, lacking these institutional 
protections, it might have been expected that cohabiting couples in gender unequal 
countries would be most likely to maintain separate financial arrangements.  
Yet, cohabiting couples in gender unequal countries reported fully integrated 
finances at similar proportions compared with married couples. One possible line of 
interpretation is that the larger institutional context of gender inequality, combined with 
rigid social expectations of marriage, transmits a taken-for-granted assumption of joining 
finances for all couples living in these contexts. Another line of interpretation is that 
cohabitation within gender unequal countries is more selective compared to more gender 
equal countries. Cohabitation may be a temporary stage on the way to marriage, or 
cohabitors in gender unequal contexts may intentionally mimic married norms as a way 
to increase legitimacy of their relationships. In more gender equal countries, freed from 
the patriarchal scripts of marriage, cohabitation may be more acceptable and include a 
more diverse set of couples who cohabit for a myriad of reasons. Another possibility is 
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that cohabitation in more gender equal countries is becoming more institutionalized and 
distinct from the scripts of marriage. Cohabitation norms in these contexts may prioritize 
access to individual money, an interpretation empirically supported by data from Swedish 
couples (Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al. 2011). 
Interestingly, the findings in this dissertation support theories that the institution 
of marriage continues to govern how couples allocate financial resources across contexts 
(Lauer and Yodanis 2010; Yodanis and Lauer 2014). Despite macro-level differences in 
gender inequality, about the same proportion of married couples reported they fully 
integrated their finances. There was a noticeable decrease in the proportion of couples 
who reported one-person managed joint money, and married couples in gender equal 
contexts were especially likely to say they managed joint money together. These findings 
are consistent with Yodanis and Lauer’s (2007b) findings that in contexts of shared 
breadwinning, married couples were more likely to report shared management than one-
manager. 
Second, a popular argument is that separate finances is indicative of family 
instability, resulting from a turn towards economic autonomy at the expense of values of 
family unity (Yodanis and Lauer 2014). The findings in this dissertation suggest pooling 
money may no longer uniquely signify relationship stability. While separate finances may 
indeed represent a lack of relationship commitment for some couples, evidence from the 
cross-national study revealed separate finances may also be indicative of prioritizing 
fairness related to control of earnings, especially for cohabiting couples. Fairness is not 
necessarily in opposition with values of family unity, and in some ways may strengthen 
family cohesion. Evidence from the vignette-survey experiment revealed widespread 
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support for economic autonomy in multiple types of circumstances, not only for couples 
without prior investments. Trend research is consistent with this interpretation. At the 
same time that rates of divorce have stabilized (Cohen 2018), a greater share of married 
couples are adopting separate money arrangements (Bank of America 2018). 
A related line of interpretation might stress that separate arrangements represents 
greater mistrust in relationships. The enforceable trust of marriage, made through a public 
commitment and legal obligations, makes commitments made in the partnership more 
difficult to break than the private agreements of cohabitation (Cherlin 2004). Therefore, 
married couples’ greater levels of pooling money compared with cohabitors might be a 
reflection of a lack of trust that the other person won’t abscond with the money. There is 
some empirical evidence for this interpretation. Low-income, unmarried mothers report 
trustworthy men are in short-supply, that their potential marriage partners cannot be 
trusted to bring consistent money into the household and in some cases drain the limited 
resources women have available to them (Edin and Kefalas 2005; Levine 2013). 
Unmarried mothers’ report desires for their partners to contribute towards specific 
expenses, but wish to maintain individual control of their financial earnings (Kenney 
2006). Individuals who have previously been divorced are also more likely to keep 
separate financial arrangements, having presumably experienced a loss of money when a 
partnership ended and carry a newfound distrust with them into their future partnerships 
(Burgoyne and Morison 1997; Treas 1993). 
It is worth considering an alternative explanation to this evidence. The gap 
between married and cohabiting couples’ integration of finances may be an artifact of 
waiting until one has enough resources and economic self-sufficiency to risk marriage 
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and pooling finances, rather than intrinsic differences in the levels of trust in cohabiting 
and married partnerships. What may be happening here is that women delay marriage and 
pooling resources until they have the means to recover from the fallout of a worst-case 
scenario, their partner absconding with the financial resources. Arguably, in some ways 
marriage was more risky for women financially in the past, when wives were more likely 
to be financially dependent on their husbands. The majority of today’s wives reject 
notions of dependency on their husbands, suggesting women regardless of marital status 
prioritize financial self-sufficiency over trusting the good will of their male partners 
(Edin and Kefalas 2005). Other anecdotal evidence suggests not pooling money requires 
a greater level of trust than pooling money (Kitchener 2018). Separate financial 
arrangements may reduce relationship conflict by minimizing opportunities to argue over 
purchases but it also introduces a form of trusting one’s partner to responsibly manage 
individual money without the need to check-up on them or take over.  
Third, gender inequality seemed to be an antecedent rather than an outcome of 
financial arrangements. Macro-level gender inequality was associated with how couples 
organized their finances. In more gender-unequal contexts, couples were more likely to 
report one person managed joint money. As gender inequality attenuated at the nation 
level, married couples reported they managed money together and cohabiting couples 
reported they kept some or all money separate. Beliefs about gender were also associated 
with respondents’ perceptions of how much total household income should be considered 
a collective resource, suggesting gender beliefs may drive financial arrangements. 
Minimal evidence suggested specific financial arrangements were associated with 
more gender inequality than other types of arrangements, with one exception. In high 
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gender-unequal contexts and when men are the higher-earners, couples were significantly 
more likely to report jointly shared money was managed by one partner. These findings 
were consistent with previous research indicating this arrangement disadvantages women 
(Tichenor 1999; Vogler and Pahl 1994; Yodanis and Lauer 2007a). On the surface, it is 
seductive to conclude that separate finances disadvantages women because it reduces 
their access to total household income. I am skeptical that separate finances is necessarily 
detrimental for women for two reasons. First, respondents indicated the preferred level of 
withholding income was slightly larger in magnitude when women were the higher-
earner compared with circumstances when men were the higher-earner. Second, I found 
no association between financial arrangements and perceptions of decision-making 
authority in couples. Third, couples in the most gender equal contexts were more likely, 
not less, to adopt a separate financial management system. 
I conclude that the persistence of conventional attitudes about gender dilutes the 
influence of women’s labor force participation on addressing inequality within families. 
Whether pooling money, keeping it separate, or doing a combination of the two facilitates 
more equal outcomes for women is likely highly dependent on the characteristics of the 
couple. The findings from this dissertation suggest couples approaches to money may be 
an attempt to actively undermine the ability to convert money into power in families, 
rather than the organization of money explaining the lack of association between relative 
resources and gender equality. I emphasize that these findings offer empirical support 
that gender beliefs, widely held cultural attitudes that distinguish characteristics of men 
and women and guide expectations for behavior, are essential to explaining persistent 
gender inequality in families (Ferree 1990; Martin 2004; Ridgeway and Correll 2004). I 
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started this dissertation by arguing that three ideologies  ̶ family unity, autonomy, 
gender  ̶  were important to critically examining two assumptions common in research 
about family economics: 1. couples pool financial resources, and 2. earnings translate 
into power. Results from Chapter Two revealed the interaction of the macro-level gender 
context and individual-level marital status was associated with how couples allocate 
resources in families. Chapters Three and Four each revealed beliefs about gender were 
drawn on to make assessments about the allocation of resources and decision-making.  
Collectively, these findings suggest gender socialization theories are essential to 
explaining persistent gender inequality in families. Findings suggested gender norms both 
constrained and facilitated the pursuit of family unity and autonomy in families. These 
results are consistent with Ridgeway's (2011) argument that gender framing processes are 
a central mechanism of continuing gender inequality in families. Ridgeway (2006, 2011) 
argued that the process of putting meaning to categories, such as men and women, 
reproduces existing inequalities. For example, women were evaluated as the more fair 
deciders regarding monetary family-decisions, in part because they were viewed as more 
trustworthy to make decisions that would be best for the family. Findings from this 
research and earlier literature caution against interpreting decision-making as an indicator 
of power (Blumstein and Schwartz 1983). Taken as a whole, these findings suggest the 
need to further investigate gender ideology as a force of persistent gender inequality in 
families. If gender ideology is a key explanatory variable to the stalled gender revolution, 




In this section, I consider some of the ways future research can improve upon the 
limitations of this dissertation and build upon these empirical findings. Because all of the 
data used in this dissertation were cross-sectional, it cannot test the influence of cultural 
changes over time. With further analyses of the ISSP data from other survey years, it 
would be possible to compare the influence of changes over time at the country level. 
Preliminary analysis of the 2002 and 2012 ISSP data showed that a shift towards more 
independent money arrangements is not universal. Couples in Chile, the Czech Republic, 
and Germany showed decreases in the proportion of couples jointly managing their 
money and increases in the proportion of couples who reported one money manager. 
Couples in Norway were significantly more likely in 2012 to report the adoption of a 
pooling some and keeping some money separate approach, compared with 2002, when 
Norwegian couples were most likely to report they jointly managed shared money. These 
preliminary results, along with the findings from Chapter 2, suggest greater testing of 
changes in macro-level treatment of cohabitation, in combination with nation-level 
gender inequality, may be critically important to teasing apart confounding variables at 
country level. 
Undertaking an analysis of short-answer responses related to the activity 
decisions, in the same way as the analysis of item decision reasoning, may also be 
important to better operationalize power in families. The vignette survey-experiment can 
also be extended in a multitude of ways. A key next step will be manipulate the race and 
sexual orientation of the fictional couple presented to respondents to compare beliefs 
about money for multiple family types. It might also be important to vary the work hours 
120 
 
of the couple, their ages, and even introduce policy differences into the vignettes. 
Changing the types of decisions facing the fictional couple may also shed new light on 
which decisions are considered desirable and when decisions are regarded as a chore. 
Fruitful research might also investigate how women experience decision-making. 
Do they feel powerful making family decisions? Along those lines, developing research 
on international differences in measuring power dynamics within family relationships 
may better assess the ways gender inequality functions as an outcome of families’ 
financial arrangements. Additional testing of financial arrangements influence on other 
measures of gender inequality, such as time spent in household labor and leisure time 
may be important to better understanding the conditions in which gender inequality is an 
outcome of financial arrangements. How financial arrangements contribute to or protect 
against inequality upon dissolution of relationships may be especially important to 
understanding the association between the household economy and women’s poverty. 
One approach would be to use a survey vignette-experiment to test attitudes about 
alimony, child support, and ownership of joint property.  
Research into the intervening factors that muddle associations between what 
people think about the treatment of money in families and how money is actually treated 
is another avenue for future research. The findings from the vignette survey-experiment 
point to the ways couples may reconcile contradictions in their own relationships, but the 
negotiations themselves cannot be analyzed using this research design. More research is 
necessary to determine when dissimilarities in attitudes and behavior result from 
differences in the operationalization of behaviors and attitudes or when they stem from 
other mechanisms.  
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Building from the results from Chapter 3, follow-up research could examine the 
ways respondents’ race and class characteristics influenced beliefs about the organization 
and use of money in relationships. It remains a puzzle whether behavioral variations in 
income organization approaches can be explained by differences in socioeconomic status 
or if they reflect divergence in normative beliefs. Models from Chapter 3 showed White 
respondents and respondents with higher incomes were less likely than people of color 
and low-income people to endorse separate money arrangements. Careful analysis of 
demographic differences in attitudes could improve sociological knowledge of how 
financial arrangements protect or confound inequality in a diversity of families.  
This finding was consistent with behavioral research showing lower-earning 
couples are more likely than their higher-earning peers to have separate accounts (Addo 
and Sassler 2010; Kenney 2006). Moreover, a number of scholars have highlighted the 
significance of class in understanding inequality in families (Damaske 2011; Edin and 
Kefalas 2005; Gibson-Davis, Edin, and McLanahan 2005; Lareau 2003). Together, this 
research suggests behavioral differences are reflective of class dissimilarities in the logic 
of money within families. 
Focusing on Class 
A larger questions remains – how does class location inform the ways couples 
negotiate tensions between commitments to financial autonomy and family unity? 
Compared to their more advantaged counterparts, working-class women are more likely 
to repeatedly enter and exit the workforce (Damaske 2011) and these interrupted work 
pathways may be associated with how low-income couples organize and think about their 
money. The rise in partial-pooling couples may be a reaction to unstable labor markets, as 
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couples develop tactics to nimbly respond to changing economic circumstances. Or, does 
the use of a partial-pooling approach result in women’s stable labor force participation 
compared to fully financially integrated couples? Little is known about how the 
allocation of financial resources within families shapes an individual’s market outcomes 
over the life course (Hobson 1990). There is also less trust in relationships among low-
income couples compared with couples with more economic resources (Levine 2013), 
which may indicate greater separation of finances as a protective strategy. Moreover, 
relationship dissatisfaction that appears to be about families’ distressed fiscal situations 
may be in actuality a consequence of couples’ financial organizational strategies (Addo 
and Sassler 2010). 
While the vignette-survey results point to situations in which couples draw on 
notions of gender, my own ongoing research involves interviewing couples in order to 
understand how organizational strategies mitigate or exacerbate gender equality in 
practice. Although most couples today report that they desire equal relationships (Gerson 
2009), the strategies used to achieve these goals may be conditional on class position. For 
instance, working-class women often manage the joint household finances, when money 
is stretched to try to make ends meet, making money management a burden (Roman and 
Vogler 1999). These women also tend to manage household funds in ways that protect 
men’s levels of personal spending money while depriving themselves (Vogler and Pahl 
1994). When women are the higher earner, couples may intentionally preserve men’s 
power within the relationship (Tichenor 1999). These patterns could be one reason lower-
earning women prioritize autonomy in their organizational approaches. Economic 
disruptions in families can also shift the gendered dynamics of couples, as when 
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unemployed men become stay-at-home fathers (Chesley 2011), meaning financial 
practices adjust to meet goals of gender equality. 
Organizational strategies may be particularly important to understanding issues of 
power when there is a surplus of income that warrants allocating (Blumberg 1988; 
Kenney 2006). Despite similar goals of equal partnerships, the strategies women use to 
bring about fairness in their relationship may vary based on class location. I suspect that 
lower-income men and women prioritize autonomy, as scarce resources already restrict 
autonomy, whereas higher-income couples may seek equal decision making through 
equal contributions. 
Using a life history analysis, I am investigating life transitions associated with 
various income organizational approaches in order to map the processes of reconciling 
contradictions between commitment to family unity and beliefs in breadwinning. 
Exploring the paradoxes between the stated reasoning behind couples’ allocation systems 
and the actual consequences of their organizational approaches is expected to add 
conceptual clarity to the ways gender and economic circumstances combine to structure 
family relations (Risman 2009). Identifying the inconsistencies in the accounts of 
people’s pursuits of unity, autonomy, and equality within families can reveal much about 
the cultural fabric of our society (Pugh 2013). 
To collect data, I am interviewing couples who are living together or married, as 
the vignette-survey experiment indicated marital status was a primary predictor of beliefs 
about money. To an extent, it is important to compare couples who are in similar life 
stages; thus, recruitment targets couples in their thirties and forties. Following the 
research design of Damaske (2011), couples in this age range are old enough to have 
124 
 
established a class position separate from their parents; are making or have already made 
decisions about marriage, parenting, and work; and they are not yet anticipating changes 
that come about with retirement and later life. Criteria used to identify participants’ class 
follows previous research, constructing a classification system using a combination of 
participants’ occupation, educational level, and income (Damaske 2011; Lareau 2003). 
Men and women tend to report access and ownership of finances differently, with 
one partner reporting shared control of finances while the other reports that one person 
makes the final decisions (Roman and Vogler 1999; Vogler and Pahl 1994). Although it 
may be advantageous to interview couples together to illuminate how they construct their 
common reality (Ludwig-Mayerhofer et al. 2011), I am conducting separate interviews to 
allow participants to share their views openly, identifying points of disagreement and 
discrepancies between partners (Burgoyne et al. 2007). I am taking a life history 
approach to interviewing, focusing on each partner’s post hoc reconstruction of their 
relationship, attending to relationship transitions that previous research suggests are 
important turning points to understanding money in families. Questions are designed to 
elicit specific event information in order to capture rich details about participants’ life 







APPENDIX A. ISSP MODELS 
Appendix Table A.1 Multinomial Regression: Relative Risk Ratios of Income Organization Arrangement, excluding single-earner 
couples and with control variables (N = 4,155) 




















Level 2 Variable                                     
Gender Inequality Index 88.25 *** 1.59  7.12  187.35 
*** 2.01  10.94  89.18 
*** 4.33  15.17 
* 
Level 1 Variables                                     
Earnings Homogamy  
(Male higher earner ref.)                   
 Female higher earner 0.87  1.02  0.98  1.11  1.08  1.04  0.87  1.00  0.97  
 About equal earnings 0.70 
* 0.92  0.74 
** 1.10  1.00  0.91  0.70 
* 0.91  0.72 
** 
Earnings Homogamy x 
GII                   
 Female higher earner       0.27 
** 0.63  0.63        
 About equal earnings       0.08 
*** 0.56  0.20 
*       
Cohabitation 1.51 ** 3.58 *** 4.85 *** 1.49 ** 3.57 *** 4.84 *** 1.31  6.75 
*** 8.13 *** 
Cohabiting x GII             0.85  0.01 
*** 0.03 *** 
Female Report 0.97  1.08  1.08  0.96  1.08  1.08  0.97  1.07  1.08  
Age 0.99  0.98 
** 0.98  0.99  0.98 
** 0.98  0.99  0.98 
* 0.98  
Parent 0.97  0.91  1.10  0.98  0.92  1.11  0.95  0.94  1.14  
Employment (full-time is ref)                  
 Part-time 1.33  0.59  1.04  1.31  0.59  1.02  1.33  0.57  1.01  
 Unemployed 1.49 
* 0.62 * 0.71  1.48 
* 0.62 * 0.71  1.48 
* 0.61 * 0.71  
 Student 1.86  0.88  2.35 
** 1.93  0.88  2.37 




 Not in labor force 1.20  0.58 
** 0.84  1.18  0.58 
** 0.84  1.20  0.58 
** 0.85  
Homemaker 1.14  0.84  0.71  1.14  0.84  0.71  1.14  0.83  0.70  
Education (Upper sec. is ref)                  
 No formal education 1.03  0.87  2.74 
* 1.00  0.88  2.66  1.02  0.93  2.94  
 Primary school 1.12  0.47  0.92  1.14  0.47  0.92  1.13  0.52  1.01  
 Lower secondary 0.92  0.82  1.00  0.93  0.83  1.01  0.92  0.82  1.00  
 Post-secondary 1.03  0.88  1.26  1.04  0.88  1.26  1.03  0.85  1.23  
 Lower level tertiary 0.72  1.25  1.95 
*** 0.73  1.25  1.95 
*** 0.73  1.23  1.94 
*** 
 Upper level tertiary 0.55 
* 1.72 *** 1.61  0.55 
* 1.72 *** 1.62  0.55 
* 1.70 *** 1.61  
Housework 0.89 *** 1.00  1.07  0.89 
*** 1.00  1.07  0.89 
*** 1.00  1.06  
Mother’s Work History 0.92  1.34  1.02  0.93  1.35  1.02  0.92  1.36  1.03  
Happy with Family Life 0.75 ** 0.79 *** 0.59 *** 0.75 ** 0.79 *** 0.59 *** 0.75 ** 0.79 *** 0.59 *** 
Intercept 2.31  1.99  3.08  1.97  1.93  2.91  2.48  1.65  2.55  
BIC 9,460 9,450 9,424 
SOURCE: International Social Survey Programme 2012 (Ages 18-54); Standard errors adjusted for 20 nation clusters 
Baseline category is Joint Management;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) 
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Appendix Table A.2 Hierarchical Multinomial Regression: Odds Ratios of Income Allocation Type with Predictor Variables 
    Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  
One 








Manages Pool Some 
Keep 
Separate 
Level 2 Variable                                     













Level 1 Variables               
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** 3.42 *** 4.54 *** 1.46 ** 3.42 *** 4.53 *** 1.29 
 
2.62 *** 3.99 *** 








0.01 *** 0.04 *** 


















* 0.98 *** 0.98 ** 0.99 * 0.98 *** 0.98 * 0.99 * 0.98 *** 0.98 * 

































































 Not in labor force 
1.68 *** 0.46 *** 0.55 ** 1.65 *** 0.46 *** 0.55 ** 1.67 *** 0.48 
 
0.57 ** 
Homemaker 1.18  
0.81 
 




0.70 * 1.18 
 
0.80 *** 0.69 * 








































































































 Upper level tertiary 
0.75 
 
1.59 *** 1.45 * 0.75 
 
1.59 *** 1.45 * 0.75 
 




1.06 * 0.91 *** 1.01 
 
0.95 * 0.91 *** 1.01 
 
1.06 * 













Happy with Family Life 0.80 
*** 0.90 
 
0.63 *** 0.79 *** 0.90 
 




*** 0.34 *** 0.21 *** 0.36 *** 0.34 *** 0.21 *** 0.36 *** 0.34 *** 0.21 *** 
SOURCE: International Social Survey Programme 2012 (Ages 18-54); Standard errors adjusted for 20 nation clusters 
Baseline category is Joint Management;  * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 (two-tailed test) (N = 4,955) 
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All 38.7 6.7 74.0 67.6 30.1 2.4 13.1 42.3 13.2 
Australia 33.4 8.9 72.1 61.9 -- 2.3 13.8 21.1 0.6 
Czech 
Republic 36.3 2.9 74.3 56.9 28.4 3.0 15.4 49.1 19.6 
Finland 40.7 11.8 80.4 77.2 30.8 2.5 18.7 58.0 14.1 
France 52.6 14.4 76.2 72.5 31.0 2.1 14.1 41.4 15.7 
Germany 32.1 5.3 77.8 67.2 30.9 2.3 16.6 16.5 14.0 
Iceland 64.1 -- 85.7 84.8 32.7 1.7 14.1 -- 8.3 
Ireland 32.8 5.9 65.1 57.3 30.7 0.8 8.3 -- 10.9 
Latvia 43.1 5.5 75.6 69.9 26.8 2.7 13.3 58.4 19.0 
Lithuania 28.5 4.1 79.0 75.3 26.2 3.1 7.0 64.8 21.0 
Norway 55.0 10.7 -- -- 32.3 2.1 6.4 -- 8.0 
Poland 19.9 1.3 71.5 65.9 26.3 1.7 10.6 53.0 22.0 
Spain 31.7 3.3 62.7 59.3 28.8 2.4 8.6 39.2 16.0 
Sweden 54.7 -- 81.9 80.3 33.4 2.3 15.1 41.0 12.5 
Switzerland 17.1 5.9 77.6 69.7 33.7 2.6 18.5 8.0 11.2 
United States 38.5 5.5 69.0 62.4 -- 3.7 19.1 72.1 0.0 
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Appendix Table A.4. Ordered Logistic Regression: Income Organization Strategy by OECD Characteristic, clustering by countries 
  
Individual Level
Cohabiting 1.57 *** 1.54 *** 1.49 *** 1.54 *** 1.55 *** 1.53 *** 1.58 *** 1.55 *** 1.66 *** 1.57 ***



















Cut 1 1.12 *** 1.69 *** 1.73 *** 4.64 * 3.61 ** 3.52 * 0.65 * 1.37 * 1.54 *** 1.16 ***
(0.18) (0.39) (0.27) (1.94) (1.30) (1.53) (0.28) (0.63) (0.32) (0.27)
Cut 2 2.51 *** 3.08 *** 3.13 *** 5.98 ** 4.95 *** 4.95 ** 2.03 *** 2.75 *** 2.93 *** 2.54 ***












6,298 6,598 6,598 6,225 7,036 7,0367,036 7,036
Paid Maternity Leave
Model 10Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
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APPENDIX B. VIGNETTE INSTRUMENT 
A. Instructions and Vignette 
 
Base: All respondents  
 
A01 [Display]  
The next questions ask your opinions of how a couple should handle money. You will be 
presented with a hypothetical scenario. Please read it closely, then continue to the next 
page. 
 
Base: All respondents 
 




Michelle and Anthony, both 31 years old, [INSERT RELSTAT TEXT] and have been a 
couple for [INSERT RELDUR TEXT]. They enjoy spending time together and 
they are happy with their relationship. They have [INSERT PARENTST 
TEXT]. [INSERT EARNINGS TEXT]. 
 
B. Vignette and Follow-Up Questions 
 
Base: All respondents  
 
SCRIPTER: Display paragraph from A02 above questions B01 to B10 on same page. 
Follow rules for dynamic inserts from A02, that is, See Appendix C.1 for Block 
Assignment, which determines dynamic inserts 
 
B01. [S] 
Couples organize their income in many different ways. Do you think Michelle and 
Anthony should:  
 
1. Have a shared account in which they both deposit all their earned income 
2. Keep all their earned income in separate, individual accounts 
3. Have both a shared account and separate, individual accounts 
 
Base: For B02 and B03, respondents who answered B01=3 ‘Have both a shared 
account and separate, individual accounts’ 
 
SCRIPTER: Randomize and record order of B02 and B03 
 
SCRIPTER: Create two number boxes, ranges determined by Range_B02; See 





How much money should Michelle put in her individual account and in the shared 
account (Total must sum to $[INSERT ceiling/max value from Total_B02, i.e. 
1,200, 2,000, or 2,800])?  
 
Shared Account: $[Number Box; see Range_B02 for range] 
Individual Account: $[Number Box; see Range_B02 for range] 
 
Total: $[Number Box; must sum to ceiling/max value from Total_B02] 
 
Base: For B02 and B03, respondents who answered B01=3 ‘Have both a shared 
account and separate, individual accounts’ 
 
SCRIPTER: Create two number boxes, ranges determined by Range_B03; See 
Appendix C.2 for range values and total values 
 
B03. [Q] 
How much money should Anthony put in his individual account and in the shared 
account (Total must sum to $[INSERT ceiling/max value from Total_B03, i.e. 
1,200, 2,000, or 2,800])?  
 
Shared Account: $[Number Box; see Range_B03 for range] 
Individual Account: $[Number Box; see Range_B03 for range] 
 
Total: $[Number Box; must sum to ceiling/max value from Total_B03] 
 
Base: All respondents  
 




Anthony and Michelle have to make a decision about [INSERT DOV_Item TEXT]. 
Although they talked this over and they care equally about the decision, [INSERT 
DOV_Person_B04 TEXT] ultimately decides since they can’t agree. How fair do you 
think it is that [INSERT DOV_Person_B04 TEXT] made the final decision? 
 
1. Very fair 
2. Somewhat fair 
3. Somewhat unfair 
4. Very unfair 
 
Base: All respondents  
 
SCRIPTER: Insert medium text box; Implement a 30-second delay before displaying 
the ‘Next’ button; Do not allow R to proceed before 30 seconds have elapsed; 




B05. [Q]  
Please explain why you indicated this decision is [INSERT ANSWER FROM B04, 
MAKE FIRST LETTER LOWER CASE].  
[SPACE] 
Please take your time and write 2-3 sentences. The ‘Next’ button will appear after 30 
seconds. 
 
[MEDIUM TEXT BOX] 
 
Base: All respondents  
 
SCRIPTER: See Appendix C.3 for DOV_Activity, DOV_Person_B06, and  
DOV_Person2_B06 values/text inserts; Prompt 
 
B06. [S]  
Most of the time Anthony and Michelle make a decision together about [INSERT 
DOV_Activity TEXT]. In instances when they can’t agree, most of the time [INSERT 
DOV_Person_B06 TEXT] eventually accepts [INSERT DOV_Person2_B06 TEXT]’s 
opinion. How fair do you think this is?  
 
1. Very fair 
2. Somewhat fair 
3. Somewhat unfair 
4. Very unfair  
 
Base: All respondents  
 
SCRIPTER: Insert medium text box; Implement a 30-second delay before displaying 
the ‘Next’ button; Do not allow R to proceed before 30 seconds have elapsed; 
Display B06 question text between A02 text and B07 question text 
 
B07. [Q]  
Please explain why you indicated this decision is [INSERT ANSWER FROM B06, 
MAKE FIRST LETTER LOWER CASE].  
[SPACE] 
Please take your time and write 2-3 sentences. The ‘Next’ button will appear after 30 
seconds. 
 





APPENDIX B.1: Block Assignment Instructions and Text for Dynamic Inserts 
BLOCK RELSTAT RELDUR PARENTST EARNINGS 
Block01 are married 3 years no children Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Anthony 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Michelle earns $1,200 a month 
Block02 are married 3 years no children Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Michelle 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Anthony earns $1,200 a month 
Block03 are married 3 years no children They both work about forty 
hours per week, and each earn 
$2,000 a month 
Block04 are married 3 years one child 
together 
Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Anthony 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Michelle earns $1,200 a month 
Block05 are married 3 years one child 
together 
Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Michelle 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Anthony earns $1,200 a month 
Block06 are married 3 years one child 
together 
They both work about forty 
hours per week, and each earn 
$2,000 a month 
Block07 are married 7 years no children Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Anthony 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Michelle earns $1,200 a month 
Block08 are married 7 years no children Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Michelle 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Anthony earns $1,200 a month 
Block09 are married 7 years no children They both work about forty 
hours per week, and each earn 
$2,000 a month 
Block10 are married 7 years one child 
together 
Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Anthony 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Michelle earns $1,200 a month 
Block11 are married 7 years one child 
together 
Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Michelle 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Anthony earns $1,200 a month 
Block12 are married 7 years one child 
together 
They both work about forty 
hours per week, and each earn 





3 years no children Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Anthony 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Michelle earns $1,200 a month 
Block14 live 
together 
3 years no children Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Michelle 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Anthony earns $1,200 a month 
Block15 live 
together 
3 years no children They both work about forty 
hours per week, and each earn 
$2,000 a month 
Block16 live 
together 
3 years one child 
together 
Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Anthony 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Michelle earns $1,200 a month 
Block17 live 
together 
3 years one child 
together 
Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Michelle 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Anthony earns $1,200 a month 
Block18 live 
together 
3 years one child 
together 
They both work about forty 
hours per week, and each earn 
$2,000 a month 
Block19 live 
together 
7 years no children Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Anthony 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Michelle earns $1,200 a month 
Block20 live 
together 
7 years no children Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Michelle 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Anthony earns $1,200 a month 
Block21 live 
together 
7 years no children They both work about forty 
hours per week, and each earn 
$2,000 a month 
Block22 live 
together 
7 years one child 
together 
Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Anthony 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Michelle earns $1,200 a month 
Block23 live 
together 
7 years one child 
together 
Although they both work about 
forty hours per week, Michelle 
earns $2,800 a month while 
Anthony earns $1,200 a month 
Block24 live 
together 
7 years one child 
together 
They both work about forty 
hours per week, and each earn 





APPENDIX B.2: B02 and B03 Number Box Ranges 
BLOCK Range_B02 Total_B02 Range_B03 Total_B03 
Block01 0-1200 1200 0-2800 2800 
Block02 0-2800 2800 0-1200 1200 
Block03 0-2000 2000 0-2000 2000 
Block04 0-1200 1200 0-2800 2800 
Block05 0-2800 2800 0-1200 1200 
Block06 0-2000 2000 0-2000 2000 
Block07 0-1200 1200 0-2800 2800 
Block08 0-2800 2800 0-1200 1200 
Block09 0-2000 2000 0-2000 2000 
Block10 0-1200 1200 0-2800 2800 
Block11 0-2800 2800 0-1200 1200 
Block12 0-2000 2000 0-2000 2000 
Block13 0-1200 1200 0-2800 2800 
Block14 0-2800 2800 0-1200 1200 
Block15 0-2000 2000 0-2000 2000 
Block16 0-1200 1200 0-2800 2800 
Block17 0-2800 2800 0-1200 1200 
Block18 0-2000 2000 0-2000 2000 
Block19 0-1200 1200 0-2800 2800 
Block20 0-2800 2800 0-1200 1200 
Block21 0-2000 2000 0-2000 2000 
Block22 0-1200 1200 0-2800 2800 
Block23 0-2800 2800 0-1200 1200 







SCRIPTING: For use with B04. Random assignment. Use fresh random seed. 
Record random selection 
1. which house or apartment to take 
2. what mattress to buy 
3. where to go on vacation 
 
DOV_PERSON_B04 
SCRIPTING: For use with B04. Random assignment. Use fresh random seed. 





SCRIPTING: For use with B06. Random assignment. Use fresh random seed. 
Record random selection 
1. shared weekend activities 
2. what movie to go see 
 
DOV_PERSON_B06 
SCRIPTING: For use with B06. Random assignment. Use fresh random seed. 





SCRIPTING: For use with B06. Assign response not selected in 





SCRIPTING: For use with B08. Random assignment. Use fresh random seed. 





SCRIPTING: For use with B08. Assign response not selected in 








SCRIPTING: For use with B10. Assign response not selected in 





SCRIPTING: For use with B10. Assign response not selected in 








APPENDIX C. Means of Dependent Measures by Vignette Manipulation 
   Marital Status   Parental Status 
  Relative Earnings   
    








Earners     
Organizational Strategy (Ns) 3,986 1,988 1,998   1,988 1,998   1,318 1,333   1,335   
 Shared    0.39       0.29       0.49  
a          0.36  
   
0.42  b          0.40           0.39          0.38   
    (0.49)    (0.45)    (0.50)  (0.48) (0.49)  (0.49) (0.49)  (0.48)  
 Separate    0.16       0.23       0.10  
a          0.20  
   
0.12  b          0.17           0.16          0.15   
    (0.37)    (0.42)    (0.30)  (0.40) (0.33)  (0.37) (0.37)  (0.36)  
 Partial-Pooling    0.45       0.48       0.41  
a          0.44  
   
0.45            0.43           0.44          0.47  
c 
    (0.50)    (0.50)    (0.49)  (0.50) (0.50)  (0.50) (0.50)  (0.50)  
Distribution of Earnings (Ns) 1,784 963 821   875 909             565            591            628    
 His Account    0.20       0.21       0.18  
a          0.21  
   
0.18  b          0.28           0.12  
 
c            0.20  cd 
     0.12     (0.12)    (0.13)  (0.13) (0.12)  (0.15) (0.06)  (0.09)  
 Her Account    0.22       0.23       0.21  
a          0.23  
   
0.21  b          0.13           0.33  
 
c            0.20  cd 
    (0.14)    (0.14)    (0.13)  (0.14) (0.13)  (0.06) (0.15)  (0.09)  
 Shared Account    0.58       0.56       0.61  
a          0.56  
   
0.60  b          0.59           0.55  
 
c            0.60  d 
    (0.19)    (0.18)    (0.20)  (0.19) (0.19)  (0.19) (0.19)  (0.17)  
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses; 
a Significantly different from cohabiting couple vignette (p < .05; two-tailed test). 
b Significantly different from child-free couple vignette (p < .05; two-tailed test). 
c Significantly different from male breadwinner couple vignette (p < .05; two-tailed test). 
d Significantly different from female breadwinner couple vignette (p < .05; two-tailed test). 
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APPENDIX D. CODING GUIDELINES FOR ANLAYSIS OF ITEM DECISION 
EXPLANATIONS  
Coding Rules  
Read each short-answer explanation of the fairness decision. It is helpful to use 
the data indicating the gender of the fictional decider and the quantitative fairness 
evaluation provided by the respondent in order to interpret the short-answer response. 
 If the short answer is left blank, N/A is entered, or random characters are 
entered, code the response as “no answer.” 
 If you find yourself needing to make too many inferences or assumptions 
to justify the code, code it as “unclear.” 
 Do not multi-code. If the exact same chunk of text addresses more than 
one code, assign the response to the first explanation the respondent 
provided. 
 For the “Gender Trumps All” code, also use the two sub-codes when 
applicable (not all “Gender Trumps All” responses will be sub-coded) 
Coding Definitions 
Each short-answer response will receive one code. 
Code the article as “Equality or Bust” if…… 
…..they reference decision was unfair because the couple needed to reach a 
consensus or compromise, or stated explicitly or implicitly the decision must be 
made equally 
 
Code the article as “Has to be Made” if…… 
……they use the phrase “has to be made” or state that the couple would lose out 
without a decision or appeal to the urgency of the decision 
 
Code the article as “Gender Trumps All” if…… 
 ……they draw on the gender of the decider explicitly or implicitly 
  
Code the article as “Happy wife/Happy life” if…… 
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…….the phrase was used explicitly or implicitly the woman’s happiness is 
used as a justification 
 
Code the article as “Head of House” if…… 
……men’s “head of household” phrase is explicitly used or implicitly 
men’s right to authority is used as a justification 
 
Code the article as “Money Talks” if 
……the relative earnings of the couple is explicitly mentioned to justify the 
fairness evaluation 
 
Code the article as “Greater Good” if 
……assumptions about the decider making a decision that is best for everyone in 
the couple/or family is provided 
 
Code the article as “Trade-offs” if 
……explicit mentions of taking turns or alternating decisions is referenced or if 
logic suggesting one person cares more about this decision and other partner 
might care about another decision is offered 
 
Code the article as “Giving in is a Decision” if 
……the phrase “giving in is a decision” is explicitly used or implicitly suggested 
that the non-decider make a choice not to argue or ultimately choose 
 
Code the article as “Item Specific” if 
……the justification uses logic that uniquely relates to the item being decided 
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